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It is well documented that returns on firms with similar characteristics move 
together. These firm characteristics include firms of similar size, price level, 
value/growth, and firms traded on the same exchange or are members of the 
same market index. An interesting firm characteristic that appears to 
contribute to strong excess comovement in stock returns is the composition of 
its owners.  
The strong correlation between institutional ownership and stock return 
comovement is consistent with different views of movement in asset prices. 
The traditional view is based on the notion that current stock prices are 
discounted present values of expected future cash flows. Under this view, 
stocks heavily (or lightly) invested by institutions may share common 
exposure to shocks to the firms’ investment opportunity sets and hence, prices 
move together. On the other hand, behavioral theories argue that market 
frictions and investor sentiment weaken the link between stock returns and 
fundamentals and induce comovement in returns that is unrelated to 
fundamentals. In this regard, retail investors may have their own trading 
habitat and their correlated sentiment shows up as a noticeable determinant of 
return comovement.  
An important distinction between the traditional and habitat view of 
comovement is that the latter assumes that the stock return movement among 
stocks sorted on institutional holdings is driven by non-fundamental factors. 
This study proposes several natural experiments to identify changes in 
institutional holdings that are not likely to be related to variations in firm’s 
fundamental values and, hence, provide a clean test of the habitat view of 
vi 
 
comovement. Specifically, I rely on three identification strategies where the 
change in institutional ownership is induced by outflows from mutual funds 
investors which represent exogenous demand shocks and are unlikely to be 
related to firm-specific events or changes in fundamental values. These 
identification strategies are: (i) mutual fund fire sales, (ii) mutual fund closure 
and (iii) mutual fund trading scandal in 2003−2004. 
The evidence in this study provides strong support for the behavioral 
explanation of the link between institutional ownership and stock return 
comovement. After a negative exogenous demand shock on institutional 
ownership, stocks comove more with low institutional ownership stocks and 
comove less with high institutional ownership stocks. Moreover, such excess 
return comovement increases with retail trading, especially for stocks favored 
by retail investors, and during periods of high market uncertainty. The overall 
results suggest that institutional ownership plays a crucial role in shaping the 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
It is well documented that returns on firms with similar characteristics move together. 
These firm characteristics include firms of similar size, price level, value/growth, and 
firms traded on the same exchange or are members of the same market index (e.g., 
Fama and French, 1993; Chan, Hameed and Lau, 2003; Barberis and Shleifer, 2003; 
Barberis, Shleifer and Wurgler, 2005; Pirinsky and Wang, 2006; Greenwood, 2008; 
Green and Hwang, 2009). An interesting firm characteristic that appears to contribute 
to strong excess comovement in stock returns is the composition of its owners 
(Patrioksi and Roulstone, 2004; Kumar and Lee, 2006). The dramatic increase in 
institutional participation in the equity markets around the world has attracted recent 
research on the relation between institutional ownership and return comovement (e.g., 
Antón and Polk 2013; Greenwood and Thesmar, 2011; Bartram, Griffin and Ng, 
2012; Faias, Ferreira, Matos and Santa-Clara, 2012). 
The strong correlation between institutional ownership and stock return 
comovement is consistent with different views of movement in asset prices. The 
traditional view is based on the notion that current stock prices are discounted present 
values of expected future cash flows. Changes in stock prices and the accompanying 
comovement in prices across stocks arise from commonality in factors that drive 
returns. Under this view, stocks heavily (or lightly) invested by institutions may share 
common exposure to shocks to the firms’ investment opportunity sets and hence, 
prices move together. On the other hand, behavioral theories argue that market 
frictions and investor sentiment weaken the link between stock returns and 
fundamentals and induce comovement in returns that is unrelated to fundamentals. 
The category and habitat views in Barberis, Shleifer and Wurgler (2005) attribute 
stock return comovement to correlated uninformed demand shocks for a group of 
securities from noise traders with correlated sentiment (see also Greenwood, 2008). 
Motivated by the classification mechanism in human thoughts, theoretical work in 
Mullainathan (2002) and Barberis and Shleifer (2003) suggest that noise traders 
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categorize stocks into different styles based on publicly observable firm 
characteristics, and the demand of style investment causes returns to comove 
excessively in the same category. Kumar and Lee (2006) present evidence of strong 
comovement among stocks with high retail investor concentration, such as small, 
value stocks with low price and low institutional ownership. Viewed in the context of 
Kumar and Lee (2006), the category (retail) investors may have their own trading 
habitat and their preferences show up as a noticeable determinant of return 
comovement.
1
 Consequently, correlated sentiment shock may cause stocks with 
similar institutional ownership levels to comove.  
An important distinction between the traditional and habitat view of comovement 
is that the latter assumes that the stock return movement among stocks sorted on 
institutional holdings is driven by non-fundamental factors. This study proposes 
several natural experiments to identify changes in institutional holdings that are not 
likely to be related to variations in firm’s fundamental values and, hence, provide a 
clean test of the habitat view of comovement. Specifically, I rely on three 
identification strategies where the change in institutional ownership is induced by 
outflows from mutual fund investors which represent exogenous demand shocks and 
are unlikely to be related to firm-specific events or changes in fundamental values. 
These identification strategies are: (i) mutual fund fire sales, (ii) mutual fund closure 
and (iii) mutual fund trading scandal in 2003−2004. 
The evidence in this study provides strong support for the habitat view of the link 
between institutional ownership and stock return comovement. I start by 
documenting that excess returns on stocks with high institutional ownership comove 
strongly (weakly) with the portfolio of high (low) institutional ownership stocks. 
                                                          
1 Barberis, Shleifer and Wurgler (2005) also argue that frictions in the marketplace generate across stock 
differences in the speed at which market-wide information and sentiment is incorporated into stock 
prices. Under this information diffusion view, stocks with varying levels of institutional holdings do not 
move together because of the differences in the speed at which information and sentiment get 
incorporated into prices. My empirical analyses suggest that information diffusion cannot fully explain 
the results reported in this study.  
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Similarly, low institutional stocks move in tandem with other low institutional 
ownership firms and have weak correlations with the portfolio of stocks mostly 
owned by institutions. These findings are robust to the adjustment of common risk 
factors, as well as firm size. While strong correlations among institution ownership 
sorted stocks are indicative of a habitat view of return movement, it does not rule out 
firms having different exposures to omitted fundamental risk factor(s). To address 
this directly, I design tests for comovement around exogenous shocks to institutional 
ownership that are unrelated to firm fundamentals. The first test is based on fire sales 
by mutual funds following Coval and Stafford (2007), who show that stock sale by 
funds with extreme outflows is in response to capital redemptions and exogenous to 
firm values. Following a fire sale, I find a shift in return comovement for stocks that 
move from high to low institutional ownership: these stocks comove more (less) with 
low (high) institutional stocks. For instance, for fire sale stocks switch from “High” 
to “Med” group, the comovement or return beta with respect to the portfolio of “Med” 
(“High”) institutional ownership stocks increases (decreases) from 0.16 to 0.79 (0.97 
to 0.37). These findings are resilient when we compare the changes in comovement 
with estimates obtained from comparable firms matched by firm characteristics such 
as industry, firm size, ownership and institutional trading. The difference-in-
difference tests confirm that the changes in return comovement are not driven by 
funds choosing to sell stocks with specific characteristics. These findings support the 
hypothesis that the large changes in institutional ownership patterns reflect changes 
in the habitat of investors in these stocks. 
The second method to identify exogenous changes in institutional holding is 
based on exits of mutual funds from the stocks arising from liquidation or mergers of 
mutual funds (Zhao, 2005). The heavy selling by these funds reduces institutional 
holdings and the changes in firm level ownership are not due to firm specific risk 
factors. Consistent with the habitat view, stocks that experience a large drop in 
institutional ownership due to the closure of the funds experience a sharp increase in 
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its comovement (or beta) with other stocks with little institutional investing and a 
corresponding decrease in comovement with high institutional ownership stocks. 
The final test is based on a drop in institutional ownership due to massive 
redemptions of mutual fund shares following litigation announcements during the 
2003−2004 mutual fund trading scandals. During this period, more than twenty 
mutual fund families were investigated for allowing for abusive trades in their mutual 
funds, such as late trading and market timing strategies for selected investors at the 
cost of others (Ferris and Yan, 2007; Qian and Tanyeri, 2011; Antón and Polk, 2013). 
I obtain results which reinforce the conclusions in the two tests above: an exogenous 
decline in institutional ownership of a stock leads to a significantly larger (smaller) 
correlation between its return and stocks owned largely by non-institutions 
(institutions). Hence, the evidence points to excess comovement in stock returns 
arising from the habitat of investors. 
The above evidence of large shift in return comovement following exogenous 
shocks in institutional ownership is consistent with correlated trading among retail 
investors, arising from uninformed demand shocks driven by market sentiment 
(Barberis, Shliefer and Wurgler, 2005; Kumar and Lee, 2006). Since retail 
(institutional) investors are likely to trade in small (large) quantities, I use the intra-
day trade size to identify the trader type and examine who trades the stocks after a 
large change in institutional ownership. There are three noteworthy findings here. 
First, I find that stocks that experience a change in return comovement following an 
exogenous drop in institutional holdings exhibit a significant increase in the 
proportion of retail trades and a decrease in institutional trades. Second, the change in 
return comovement is stronger among stocks with a concentration of retail investors. 
Here, stocks favored by retailed investors are identified using firm characteristics 
such as firm size, stock price and retail trading intensity, as well as fund 
characteristics such as the domicile country of the owner funds (Kumar and Lee, 
2006; Pirinsky and Wang, 2006). Third, the changes in return comovement 
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subsequent to the abrupt drop in institutional ownership are amplified when market 
volatility is high and when investor sentiment is high. The latter finding is consistent 
with intensified investor behavioral biases driving return comovement when markets 
are highly uncertain (e.g., Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam, 1998, 2001; 
Hirshleifer, 2001; Kumar, 2009; Kumar, Page and Spalt, 2013). Collectively, these 
findings suggest that retail investor habitat contributes to excessive comovement in 
stock returns. 
I extend the analyses of the changes in institutional holdings by looking at their 
impact on stock prices. Kaniel, Saar and Titman (2008) show that retail investors 
provide liquidity to institutional trading, which suggests that stocks that move from 
high to low institutional ownership involve retail investors absorbing these flow-
driven shocks. Combined with the observation that trading by retail investors is 
driven by market sentiment, I predict that the short-term price impact of institutional 
sale would be stronger (weaker) when market sentiment is low (high). Following 
Coval and Stafford (2007), I also examine the performance of the portfolio over the 
next few quarters. The results support the intuition that retail investors require higher 
premium for liquidity provision during periods of low sentiment (or low liquidity). 
This thesis adds to the growing literature on the relationship between institutional 
investing and stock return comovement. Antón and Polk (2013) document that 
common active mutual fund ownership explains the pair-wise return comovement, 
controlling for similarity in style such as industry, size, value, momentum and other 
pair characteristics. They further show that for stocks with common ownership, the 
interaction between cash flow news and discount rate news across stocks increases 
the comovement. They focus on institutional connectedness, and place the analysis 
under a rational framework. They further investigate mutual fund trading scandals to 
show that the exogenous variation in common ownership causes abnormal return 
correlation in the following month. Similarly, Faias, Ferreira, Matos and Santa-Clara 
(2012) focus on the cash flow view of international stock return comovement and 
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study the key determinants such as industry, country and global factors. They find 
that industry and global factors are relatively more important than country factors in 
explaining stock return variation among stocks with higher institutional ownership. 
Among papers exploring non fundamental-related return comovement, Greenwood 
and Thesmar (2011) point out that mutual funds face correlated liquidity shocks, and 
the stocks they hold can comove even without overlapping holdings. They also 
assume that the flow-driven trading is not motivated by fundamentals, but rather by 
investors’ demand for liquidity. Bartram, Griffin and Ng (2012) construct a measure 
of foreign equity returns of the stock’s shareholders to proxy for investor habitat, and 
show that the ownership return captures considerable covariation beyond the industry, 
local, global market returns and other standard controls. This thesis provides more 
direct evidence of institutional ownership-based return comovement. Using mutual 
fund fire sales, mutual fund closure and trading scandal as natural experiments to 
control for the fundamental factors, I am able to pin down the causal effect of 
institutional ownership and add new insights on the behavioral explanation for return 
comovement. 
This study contributes to the recent behavioral finance literature on return 
comovement.
2
 A growing number of empirical studies investigate firm-specific 
events – e.g., addition to or deletion from an index, stock splits, as well as various 
firm characteristics such as index membership (Barberis, Shleifer and Wurgler, 2005; 
Greenwood, 2008), price (Green and Hwang, 2009), trading location and headquarter 
location (Chan, Hameed and Lau, 2003; Pirinsky and Wang, 2006), and find 
evidence in line with the category or habitat view of return comovement, that is, the 
                                                          
2 A number of empirical evidence shows that the observed stock returns comove beyond fundamentals. 
Shiller (1989) finds that comovement in real stock prices between U.K. and U.S. is too large to be 
accounted for comovement in real dividends. Fama and French (1995) argue that size and value factor in 
returns mirror common factors in earnings, while no systematic evidence suggests that common 
variation in returns is driven by the common factors in earnings, especially for the value factor. 
Therefore, the comovement in returns of small and value stocks cannot be fully explained by cash flow 
comovement. Froot and Dabora (1999) study twin stocks that share the total cash flow of two 
companies, but have different trading and ownership habitats. Instead of moving together, the relative 
prices of twin stocks appear to be correlated with the markets on which they are intensively traded. 
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demand of style investment or the commonality in investor clientele leads to excess 
return comovement.
3
 This study contributes by revealing that institutional ownership 
is another important firm characteristic in shaping the investor clientele and the 
consequent excess return comovement. In doing this, the empirical evidence also 
extend the literature on holding specific categories of stock (Kang and Stulz, 1997; 
Coval and Moskowitz, 1999; Frieder and Subrahmanyam, 2005). 
These findings also add to the literature that examines the relationship between 
retail trading behavior and stock return comovement. Kumar and Lee (2006) show 
that correlated trading among retail investors has incremental power in explaining 
return comovement, particularly for stocks with high retail concentrations. Kumar, 
Page and Spalt (2013) include both retail and institutional investors, and investigate 
the trading-comovement relation within two stock categories: price and location. 
They argue that correlated retail trading generates stronger comovement patterns 
while informed institutional trading weakens them, and the overall results are 
consistent with the habitat view of return comovement. This study broadens their 
results to another non-fundamental factor – ownership composition, and draws 
attention to the issue of retail trading activities as well as their impact on stock return 
and return comovement. 
The remainder of the thesis is structured as follows. In Chapter 2, I hypothesize 
the relation between institutional ownership, retail trading and stock return 
comovement. In Chapter 3, I describe the data and the construction of the main 
                                                          
3 Barberis, Shleifer and Wurgler (2005) find that stocks added to the Standard & Poor (S&P) 500 index 
begin to comove more with other members of the index and comove less with non-S&P 500 stocks, and 
Greenwood (2008) documents a strong positive (negative) relationship between index overweighting 
and comovement with stocks in (outside) the Nikkei 225 index. They argue that the stock return 
comovement is driven by the commonality in trading behavior, such as index-link investment products 
and index funds. Chan, Hameed and Lau (2003) show that after the departure of trading location from 
the core business location, the delisting firms comove more with the market where the stocks are traded 
and comove less with the market where the core business is located, and the price fluctuations are 
affected by country-specific investor sentiment. Pirinsky and Wang (2006) document strong 
comovement in the stock returns of firms headquartered in the same geographic area. The local 
comovement of stock returns is not explained by economic fundamentals and is stronger for smaller 
firms with more individual investors and in regions with less financially sophisticated residents. They 
further conclude that the geography-based return comovement is induced by familiarity and visibility of 
the firm in the local community. Green and Hwang (2009) show that stocks undergo splits experience an 
increase (decrease) in comovement with low-priced (high-priced) stocks. They further conclude that 
investors categorize stocks based on price, which serves as a new source of return comovement. 
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variables. In Chapter 4, I examine the relation between institutional ownership and 
stock return comovement using natural experiments, and provide evidence of 
category or habitat view of return comovement. In Chapter 5, I investigate whether 
and how retail trading activities generate this excess return comovement. In Chapter 




CHAPTER 2. HYPOTHESES 
Previous evidence on the link between institutional ownership and stock return 
comovement suggests that return comovement is positively associated with the level 
of institutional holdings, and significant institutional ownership facilitates intra-
industry information transfers, increasing the return comovement among firms in the 
same industry (Piotroski and Roulstone, 2004). In addition, Falkenstein (1996) shows 
that mutual funds have a comparative advantage and preference towards stocks with 
high visibility and low transaction costs, and an aversion to small firms with low 
price. In this regard, stock returns move together because of the common information 
about fundamental values as well as the common preference to invest in stocks with 
certain characteristics. Recent work turns to explain the stock return comovement by 
focusing on investor behavioral biases – i.e., style investment (category view), 
investor habitats (habitat view) and underreaction to public information (information 
diffusion view), developed by Barberis, Shleifer and Wurgler (2005). First of all, 
category view holds that to simplify the portfolio allocation process, investors first 
group stocks into categories, and then allocate funds across categories as well as 
trade the entire categories (e.g., Barberis and Shleifer, 2003; Barberis, Shleifer and 
Wurgler, 2005; Greenwood, 2008; Green and Hwang, 2009). Barberis and Shleifer 
(2003) model an economy with positive feedback investors, who categorize risky 
assets into different styles and move funds among these styles depending on their 
relative past performance, as well as fundamental traders, who act as arbitrageurs 
with a short horizon. They further show that the demand of style investing generates 
return comovement in the same category, even when the underlying cash flows have 
little in common. Moreover, fundamental traders might exacerbate rather than 
counteract the mispricing. Secondly, habitat view argues that investors choose to 
trade only a subset of all available securities, and restrict themselves within different 
natural habitats (e.g., Bodurtha, Kim and Lee, 1995; Chan, Hameed and Lau, 2003; 
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Kumar and Lee, 2006; Pirinsky and Wang, 2006; Kumar, Page and Spalt, 2013).
4
 
Bodurtha, Kim and Lee (1995) propose a clientele-based model when investors only 
invest in domestic securities. The model implies that the security price is determined 
not only by its fundamental value, but also by domestic market movements as well as 
domestic demands or sentiments.
5
 Thirdly, information diffusion view indicates that 
stock return comovement is driven by common factors in the speed at which market-
wide information or sentiment is incorporated into stock prices. Some stocks reflect 
information or sentiment immediately, while others reflect with a delay (Barberis, 
Shleifer and Wurgler, 2005; Greenwood, 2008).
6
   
These considerations suggest that in an economy with market frictions and 
investor irrationality, the excess return comovement reflects the correlated 
uninformed demand shocks for a particular group of securities. More specifically, in 
addition to the link between institutional ownership and future cash flow, institutional 
ownership also represents the investor clientele that is unrelated to the fundamental 
firm value, and the commonality in investor clientele as well as the trading behavior 
generates excess return comovement. 
To see in absence of fundamental factors, whether and how the investor clientele 
affects the excess return comovement, a natural experiment featured by an exogenous 
demand shock will help to lay out some testable predictions. On one hand, if the 
return comovement results from the correlations in news about their fundamental 
values, it should remain the same after this exogenous shock on institutional 
                                                          
4  The category view and habitat view are not mutually exclusive, as in both cases stock return 
comovement is driven by correlated uninformed demand shocks for a particular group of securities, 
especially from noise traders with correlated sentiment (Barberis, Shleifer and Wurgler, 2005; 
Greenwood, 2008). The category view focuses on groups of assets that investors do not distinguish 
between, while the habit view interprets them as groups of assets only held by a specific subset of 
investors. 
5 They empirically study the close-end foreign country funds traded in U.S. while invest solely in a 
foreign security market, and find that individual fund premiums move together primarily due to the 
comovement of their stock prices with the U.S. market, and the U.S.-specific risk might be interpreted as 
U.S. market sentiment. 
6 Barberis, Shleifer and Wurgler (2005) report that information appears to enter non-S&P 500 returns 
more slowly than S&P 500 returns, although the delay is short. Greenwood (2008) shows that a trading 
strategy based on the reversion of comovement over intermediate horizons generates economic profits, 
resulting from a mispricing of index stocks rather than the improved pricing efficiency as predicted by 
the information diffusion view. 
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ownership. On the other hand, if the return comovement is due to the correlated 
trading activities among investors, the demand shock from institutional investors 
leads to different investor clienteles, which triggers a change in return comovement 
accordingly. The main tests concentrate on the change in return comovement after a 
substantial change in institutional ownership caused by mutual fund fire sales, mutual 
fund closure and trading scandal, and more detailed definitions will be provided 
shortly. This intuition is summarized in the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1a (Firm Fundamental-Driven Comovement): Stock return 
comovement is unrelated to an exogenous shock on institutional ownership. 
Hypothesis 1b (Investor Clientele-Driven Comovement): Stock return 
comovement is related to an exogenous shock on institutional ownership. More 
specifically, after a negative exogenous shock on institutional ownership, the stocks 
will comove more with low institutional ownership stocks and comove less with high 
institutional ownership stocks. 
As predicted by behavioral models, if the return comovement arises from the 
commonality in investor clientele, the excess return comovement increases with 
correlated uninformed demand shocks, especially from noise traders with correlated 
sentiment. In general, retail investors have limited access to inside information, 
limited resources to search for all the stocks, and they are less sophisticated in 
making investment decisions. They rely more on public information and advises 
provided by professionals, hence engage in more recognition-based or attention-
based trading (e.g., Odean, 1999; Frieder and Subrahmanyam, 2005; Kumar and Lee, 
2006; Barber and Odean, 2008). Therefore, more retail trading is expected to 
generate stronger non fundamental-related return comovement, as well as greater 
shift in return comovement after an exogenous demand shock, especially among 
stocks with high retail concentration, as they are more sensitive to the shifts in retail 




Hypothesis 2 (Retail Trading and Comovement): The shift in return 
comovement increases with retail trading. 
Hypothesis 3 (Retail Concentration and Comovement): The shift in return 
comovement increases in firms with high retail concentration. 
Existing literature shows that investors are more likely to be prone to 
psychological biases in valuing securities in the context of more sparse and uncertain 
information environment, when the mispricing cannot be fully corrected (e.g., Daniel, 
Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam, 1998, 2001; Hirshleifer, 2001; Kumar, 2009; Kumar, 
Page and Spalt, 2013). In a similar vein, if the institutional ownership-based return 
comovement is related to the demand of style investment or the commonality in 
investor clientele, the investors will exhibit stronger behavioral biases when market is 
highly uncertain, and further generate more correlated trading and stronger return 
comovement. This leads to the final hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 4 (Market Uncertainty and Comovement): The return comovement 
increases during periods of high market uncertainty. 
Before testing the hypotheses, the next chapter describes the data and the 




CHAPTER 3. DATA AND VARIABLES CONSTRUCTION 
3.1 Data Sources 
The data come from several sources. I obtain quarterly institutional holdings data 
from Thomson-Reuters mutual fund holdings database. The data contain quarter-end 
security holding information for all registered mutual funds that report their holdings 
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Using MFLINKS tables, I 
match the holdings database to CRSP survivorship bias free mutual fund database 
that reports monthly total returns and total net assets (TNA).
7
 The overall data is 
sparse before 1990 so the sample period is restricted to 1990–2010. From these, I 
compute stock-level aggregate institutional ownership variables which will be 
described shortly. When a portfolio has multiple share classes, I compute its total 
return as the total net asset-weighted return of all share classes of the portfolio, where 
total net asset (TNA) values are one-month lagged. 
In addition to the mutual fund data, I obtain intraday transactions data from 
Institute for the Study of Security Markets (ISSM) database (1990–1992) and Trade 
and Quote (TAQ) database (1993–2000). I end the analysis in 2000, as the later use 
of decimalization and computerized trading algorithms undermines the ability to 
identify retail trades (Barber, Odean and Zhu, 2009). Following Lee and 
Radhakrishna (2000), I classify trades of $5,000 or less as small (retail) trades, and 
trades of $50,000 or more as large (institutional) trades. To account for the changes 
in purchasing power over time, the trade size is adjusted by the Consumer Price 
Index (CPI) based on real dollars at the beginning of 1991.
8
  
Moreover, for global mutual funds, I obtain quarterly holdings data from 
Factset/Lionshares database,
9
 and monthly total returns, TNA from Morningstar 
                                                          
7 MFLINKS tables are provided by Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS), a detailed description 
can be found in Wermers (2000). 
8 Lee and Radhakrishna (2000) cover a three-month period during 1990–1991 and document that the 
trade size proxy separates individual and institutional trading activities, thus year 1991 is chosen as the 
benchmark. 
9 A detailed description of the dataset can be found in Ferreira and Matos (2008).  
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mutual fund database (2000–2008). Daily and monthly stock price, return, trading 
volume, shares outstanding data come from the Center for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP) database, and quarterly analyst data come from the Institutional 
Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S) database. Only common stocks listed on NYSE, 
AMEX and NASDAQ and also held by mutual funds are included in the analysis. 
Finally, I obtain daily and monthly Fama-French-Carhart four factors (market, size, 
book-to-market and momentum) and risk-free rate from WRDS, monthly aggregate 
market-level investor sentiment data from Jeffrey Wurgler’s website, and daily 
Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) Volatility Index (VIX) from CBOE 
website.
10
 A detailed definition of each variable is reported in the Appendix. 
3.2 Variables Construction 
To describe the main variables used in the analysis, I start with the proxy for fund 
flow. Fund flow for fund   in a given month  is computed as follows:  
                , , , 1 , , 11 ,/f m f m f m f m f mFlow TNA TNA R TNA        (1) 
where       refers to the total net assets of fund   in month , and     refers to 
the fund total return in the same month. To match with quarterly institutional 
holdings data, I compute average monthly fund flow in a quarter as        , for fund 
  in quarter  .  
Following Coval and Stafford (2007), I define severe outflows (inflows) to be 




) percentile of all fund flows in each quarter. 
Accordingly, flow-induced fire sales (purchases) are identified as reductions 
(increases) in shares owned by funds experiencing severe outflows (inflows). For 
stock   in a given quarter  , the change in institutional ownership due to fire sales is 
computed as follows:  
                                                          
10 Investor sentiment data come from Jeffrey Wurgler’s website http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~jwurgler/, 
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where          refers to the change of investment weight of stock   in fund   in 
quarter  , and the investment weight (institutional ownership) is defined as the ratio 
between number of shares held by fund   and number of shares outstanding of stock 
 ,         refers to the average monthly flow for fund   in quarter   defined as above, 




 percentile of quarterly fund flow 
among all funds in quarter  , respectively. The net change in institutional ownership 
is first computed at stock-fund level, and then aggregate across all funds investing in 
stock  . It captures the net impact from flow-induced institutional trading. Finally, in 
each quarter, stocks with          below the bottom quintile are considered as fire 
sale stocks. To avoid the potential bias in mutual fund buying decisions due to its 
stock selection and market timing ability (even in the case of fire purchases), this 
study focuses on fire sale stocks with a decrease in aggregate institutional ownership, 
that is          should be negative. To make sure that the change in mutual fund 
ownership is driven by the affected funds, I also provide robustness checks based on 
the absolute change from flow-induced institutional trading to confirm the intuition 
from the main proxy.  
Following the methodology in existing literature (e.g., Barberis, Shleifer and 
Wurgler, 2005; Greenwood, 2008; Green and Hwang, 2009), I move to estimate the 
return comovement of stocks with an exogenous negative shock on institutional 
ownership. At the beginning of each quarter, stocks are sorted into terciles (Low, 
Med and High) according to lagged institutional ownership. For each fire sale stock 
that switches to a different tercile, return comovement is estimated from the 
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where        refers to the return of stock   on day   of quarter  ,              and 
              refer to the equal-weighted (or value-weighted) portfolio return for stocks 
with different levels of institutional ownership (Low, Med and High) before and after 
the switch, respectively. As a robustness check, I also extend the baseline model and 
control for common risk factors related to firm fundamentals, e.g., CAPM and Fama-
French-Carhart four-factor model. 
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where        ,       ,        and        refer to Fama-French-Carhart factors 
(market, size, book-to-market and momentum). 
Later, I compute the changes in            and             for each stock-quarter in 
the switch sample, e.g.,                                    , then average across all 
stocks in each quarter, and finally average over the entire sample period. 
3.3 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of the data. Panel A tabulates the mean, 
median, standard deviation, and the quantile distribution of the quarterly institutional 
ownership and its change, monthly fund flow, other quarterly stock characteristics 
and monthly market characteristics. To understand the potential difference between 
fire sale stocks and others, I report the stock characteristics separately, Panel A1 for 
the full sample and Panel A2 for the switch sample, which contains fire sale stocks 
switch to a different ownership group (defined by tercile). The two sets of firms are 
similar in size, liquidity, stock price and institutional ownership level, while the 
switch sample displays much higher change in institutional ownership by 
construction. Panel B reports the distribution of changes in return comovement for 
17 
 
fire sale stocks. One interesting observation is that for fire sale stocks switch to a 
different institutional ownership category, for example, “High” to “Med”, they 
comove more with other stocks in the “Med” group (with an average 0.629 increase) 
and comove less with the original “High” group (with an average 0.596 decrease). 
This provides some initial evidence on the change in return comovement after a non 
fundamental-related exogenous shock. Of course, these numbers are merely 
preliminary and suggestive evidence. In the next chapter, more formal tests are 
conducted to explore this issue. Panel C computes the correlation matrix of the main 




CHAPTER 4. NATURAL EXPERIMENTS ON RETURN COMOVEMENT 
I start by investigating what drives the return comovement among stocks with similar 
institutional ownership. I first verify a general relation between institutional 
ownership and return comovement. Then, I use three identifications as natural 
experiments to test the driving force of such return comovement, as discussed in the 
first hypothesis. Later, I focus on mutual fund fire sales as the main identification and 
provide a number of robustness checks.  
4.1 A Preliminary Analysis on Institutional Ownership and Return 
Comovement 
To examine the relationship between institutional ownership and return comovement, 
at the beginning of each quarter, stocks are sorted into terciles according to lagged 
institutional ownership. For each stock with non-zero institutional ownership, return 
comovement is estimated from the following univariate regressions in each quarter. 
                           , , , , , , , , , ,i t q i q IO i q IO t q i t qR R                                                     (5) 
where        refers to the return of stock   on day   of quarter  ,         refers to the 
institutional ownership-weighted return. To capture the cross-sectional variation in 
firm characteristics, I further control for the common risk factors, e.g., CAPM and 
Fama-French-Carhart four-factor model. I first compute the cross-sectional average 
of regression coefficients         in each quarter, and then average over the entire 
sample period.  
I report the results in Table 2 Panel A. The results show that stocks with high 
institutional ownership comove more with the institutional ownership-weighted 
return index. For example, when institutional ownership increases from bottom to top 
tercile, the average return comovement rises from 0.658 to 1.035 in baseline model in 
Equation (5), and rises from 0.677 to 0.818 after controlling for Fama-French-Carhart 
factors. The differences between terciles with high and low institutional ownership 
are also statistically significant. 
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Similarly, in Table 2 Panel B, I estimate the stock-level return comovement from 
the following bivariate regressions in each quarter. 
           , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,i t q i q LowIO i q LowIO t q HighIO i q HighIO t q i t qR R R                                (6) 
where        refers to the return of stock   on day   of quarter  ,            and 
            refer to the equal-weighted (or value-weighted) portfolio return for stocks 
with low (bottom tercile) and high (top tercile) institutional ownership, respectively.  
The results suggest that stocks with high (low) institutional ownership comove 
more with other high (low) institutional ownership stocks. For example, when 
institutional ownership increases from bottom to top tercile, the return comovement 
with low (high) institutional ownership group declines (rises) from 0.937 (0.044) to 
0.005 (0.991) in Equation (6). Furthermore, all differences between terciles with high 
and low institutional ownership are statistically significant at 1% level, and the 
results are robust after controlling for common risk factors related to firm 
fundamentals (e.g., CAPM and Fama-French-Carhart four-factor model). 
Panels C and D tabulate similar statistics when further control for the impact of 
firm size, following Pirinsky and Wang (2004). At the beginning of each quarter, 
stocks are first sorted into quintiles according to lagged market capitalization, and 
then within each size quintile stocks are sorted into terciles according to lagged 
institutional ownership. Return comovement is estimated from the univariate or 
bivariate regressions in each quarter, as in Equations (5) and (6). The results are 
similar to those in Panels A and B. The strong correlation between institutional 
ownership and return comovement is in line with a traditional view of cash flow 
comovement, as well as other behavioral explanations, i.e., category, habitat and 
information diffusion view of return comovement (Barberis, Shleifer and Wurgler, 
2005). A subsequent question to explore is what drives such institutional ownership-
based return comovement. 
4.2 Exogenous Shocks on Institutional Ownership and Return Comovement 
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To understand the driving force of institutional ownership-based return comovement, 
I empirically test Hypothesis 1 using three identifications as natural experiments. The 
first identification is mutual fund fire sales. In general, mutual funds are not allowed 
to short sell and do not maintain significant cash balances given the equity 
benchmarks they track. When outside investors withdraw their capital and mutual 
funds experience extreme outflows, mutual fund managers will have no choice but to 
sell some of existing holdings to cover redemptions. Therefore, it is considered as a 
pure flow-induced institutional trading (Coval and Stafford, 2007), and proxies for an 
exogenous shock on institutional ownership. The second identification is mutual fund 
closure. In the mutual fund industry, exits may take the form of liquidation or merger 
(Zhao, 2005). The mutual fund manager needs to sell out their holdings in the case of 
liquidation, as well as in a fund merger especially when acquiring portfolio and target 
portfolio do not share the same investment philosophy. The selling pressure from 
mutual funds that go out of business does not depend on certain stock characteristics, 
and therefore qualifies as an exogenous shock on the institutional ownership at the 
stock level. The third identification is the 2003−2004 mutual fund trading scandal. At 
that time, more than twenty mutual fund families were investigated for engaging in 
abusive practices, i.e., late trading and market timing for selected investors at the cost 
of others (Ferris and Yan, 2007; Qian and Tanyeri, 2011; Antón and Polk, 2013). The 
massive redemption of mutual fund shares following litigation announcements force 
the implicated funds to liquidate assets quickly, and I use this as an exogenous selling 
pressure for the stocks held by the funds. In all three cases, we observe substantial 
changes in institutional ownership but not accompanying changes in firm’s 
fundamental value. Under the hypothesis of firm fundamental-driven comovement, 
the return comovement should not change with respect to such exogenous demand 
shocks (Hypothesis 1a). However, if the return comovement changes accordingly, it 
supports the behavioral explanations in investor clientele hypothesis (Hypothesis 1b). 
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At the beginning of each quarter  , stocks are sorted into terciles according to 
lagged institutional ownership. For each fire sale stock that switches to a different 
tercile, return comovement is estimated by Equation (3), separately for one quarter 
before (quarter    ) and after the switch (quarter  ). I report the average changes in 
stock return comovement around institutional ownership change in Table 3, where 
Panel A presents Equation (3) results and Panel B further controls for common risk 
factors related to firm fundamentals (e.g., CAPM and Fama-French-Carhart four-
factor model), as in Equations (4) and (4’). The t-statistics reported in parentheses are 
Newey-West heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-adjusted (Newey and West, 1987) 
with three lags unless otherwise specified. 
The results in Table 3 suggest that stocks that switch to a lower institutional 
ownership tercile comove more with the new institutional ownership range and 
comove less with the previous one. This holds when institutional ownership changes 
across different groups, over the entire sample period as well as in most sub-periods, 
after controlling for firm fundamentals. In equal-weighted full sample baseline results, 
when fire sale stocks switch from “High” to “Med” group, their return comovement 
with “Med” (“High”) tercile increases (decreases) by 0.631 (0.595). The effect is 
economically significant, compared to their average return comovement of 0.163 
with “Med” and 0.967 with “High” tercile before the switch. The significant change 
in return comovement provides the first evidence that the institutional ownership-
based return comovement is related to some non-fundamental factors, as predicted by 
Hypothesis 1b. 
The results on mutual fund closure and the 2003−2004 trading scandal are 
reported in Table 4 with a similar layout and methodology to Table 3. The only 
difference is, instead of the fire sale stocks, in Panels A1 and B1, I focus on those 
stocks held by at least one mutual fund that was liquidated in the previous quarter and 
has experienced a drop in institutional ownership tercile. CRSP Survivor-Bias Free 
U.S. Mutual Fund Database provides the reason for the fund delisting, i.e., 
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liquidation, merge, convert to close-end, etc. I also cross check the CRSP delisting 
date with the last reporting date in the Thomson-Reuters mutual fund holdings 
database to determine the quarter of liquidation. The results are similar to those seen 
from Table 3 for fire sale stocks: stocks switch to lower institutional ownership 
category exhibit a higher (lower) return comovement with the low (high) ownership 
category, after controlling for common risk factors related to firm fundamentals (e.g., 
CAPM and Fama-French-Carhart four-factor model). This significant change fits 
well with the behavioral explanations of excess return comovement, among stocks 
with similar institutional ownership.
11
 
In Panels A2 and B2 of Table 4, I use the sample of stocks held by at least one 
fund whose fund family (asset management company) was affected by the trading 
scandal of 2003–2004 to identify the exogenous shock to institutional ownership. 
Stocks that drop to a lower institutional ownership tercile in the quarter following the 
litigation announcements are labeled as having a change in institutional ownership 
that are unrelated to fundamental shocks. 12  The results confirm that when the 
institutional ownership is significantly reduced after the litigation announcements, 
the stock return comovement tracks the low institutional ownership group, although 
the institutional selling is not related to the fundamental value of the firm involved. In 
short, these three identifications help to verify the existence of non-fundamental 
factors in the institutional ownership-based return comovement. In the remaining 
tests, I will focus on the main identification of mutual fund fire sales to have a 
broader coverage in terms of sample period and sample size. 
For mutual fund fire sales, one potential concern is that fund managers might 
choose to sell stocks with certain characteristics, when facing extreme net outflows. 
To address the potential ex ante selection bias, I measure the excess changes in return 
                                                          
11  Focusing on fund liquidations provides a cleaner test, while (unreported) results are similar but 
slightly weaker when include both fund liquidations and mergers.  
12 A detailed description of fund families involved in the trading scandal and the initial news date can be 
found in Qian and Tanyeri (2011). They conduct a keyword search of Financial Times, Wall Street 
Journal, the SEC litigation filings as well as the Stanford Law School Securities Class Action 
Clearinghouse. The final sample of implicated fund families is similar to that in Ferris and Yan (2007). 
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comovement by subtracting the corresponding estimates for matching firms (Barberis, 
Shleifer and Wurgler, 2005; Green and Hwang, 2009). Each fire sale stock switches 
to a different tercile is matched with another stock in the same industry, same size 
decile (within industry), same institutional ownership tercile, closest fire sale amount 
over the quarter before the switch, but does not switch to a different ownership tercile. 
For each fire sale stock   (switches to a different category) and its respective 
matching firm    (stays in the original category), return comovement is estimated 
from Equation (3), during the quarter before and after the switch. I compute the 
changes in regression coefficients for switch firms and matching firms separately, i.e., 
                                    for switch sample and              
                          for matching sample, then compute the differences for each 
switch-matching pair, i.e.,  (           )                          . Similar to the 
previous analysis, the sample mean of two difference-in-difference proxies 
 (           ) and  (            ) are computed as the average across all stocks in 
each quarter, and then over the entire sample period. 
Table 5 tabulates the difference-in-difference results. Comparing to matching 
firms, the switch firms exhibit higher (lower) comovement with the new (original) 
institutional ownership category. This further confirms that the changes in excess 
return comovement for fire sale stocks are not driven by some firm-specific 
characteristics in the testing sample. 
It is important to notice that this finding withstands a number of robustness 
checks reported in Table 6. Panel A considers fire sale stocks from the bottom tercile 
of institutional ownership. These stocks, by construction, remain in the same 
category although there exists heavy institutional selling. Interestingly, the return 




I also examine if the results are driven by a few stocks which form a large 
proportion of a fund facing fire sale risk. Since the fund outflow is related to past 
fund performance (Coval and Stafford, 2007), to make sure that the past performance 
of the stock held by the fund does not lead to both mutual fund fire sales and the 
return comovement change, Panel B excludes leading stocks that underperform 
(returns below median) in the previous quarter. A leading stock is defined as the 
stock that takes up the largest investment weight according to the most updated 
holding information of the fund. 
In addition, I consider alternative definitions of fire sale stocks, in terms of 
relative change as well as absolute change. In Panel C, fire sale stocks are defined as 
those with          in bottom decile, and in Panel D, fire sale stocks are defined as 
those with          accounts for at least fifty percent of the total ownership change. 
The (unreported) results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar for different 
thresholds such as seventy-five percent and ninety percent. In short, the previous 
pattern of return comovement remains unchanged in Panels B to D. 
Different from category or habitat view of return comovement, the information 
diffusion view makes a prediction that there exists positive cross autocorrelation 
among ownership groups. Stocks with different institutional holdings might reflect 
information and sentiment at a lag due to differences in the speed of adjustment in 
prices. To address this issue, I include up to three leading and lagged institutional 
ownership portfolio returns, and augment Equation (3) to estimate: 
, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,
k k
i t q i q PreIO i n q PreIO i t n q PostIO i n q PostIO i t n q i t qn k n k
R R R               (7) 
where        refers to the return of stock   on day   of quarter  ,                and 
                refer to the equal-weighted (or value-weighted) portfolio return for 
stocks with different levels of institutional ownership (Low, Med and High) before 
and after the switch, respectively, and   is the number of days before or after day  . 
The total return comovement is defined as the sum of lag, contemporaneous and lead 
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beta coefficients in Equation (7), i.e.,            ∑            
 
     and             
∑             
 
    ,     or    .  
Table 7 reports the average changes in total return comovement, as well as the 
individual lag, contemporaneous and lead beta coefficients in Equation (7). Two 
findings are worthy of special attention. First, as an alternative comovement measure, 
the total return comovement provides evidence largely consistent with baseline 
model in Table 3. Second, the contemporaneous effect still dominates the lead-lag 
effect, and this further suggests that non-synchronous response to information cannot 
explain the entire shift in return comovement. 
Finally, as suggested by the category or habitat view of return comovement, the 
non fundamental-related comovement crucially depends on whether the institutional 
ownership is observable to investors. As a robustness check, (unreported) results 
indicate that the change in return comovement comes from the quarter after 
institutional holdings are disclosed, rather than the contemporaneous quarter.  
In summary, all three strategies of identifying a negative exogenous shock in 
institutional ownership lead to the conclusion that stock return comovement among 
firms with similar institutional ownership levels cannot be fully explained by 
comovement in fundamentals. At the same time, the non-fundamental source of 
return comovement I report is consistent with the category or habitat view of return 
comovement (Hypothesis 1b), and institutional ownership is a salient characteristic 




CHAPTER 5. RETAIL TRADING AND RETURN COMOVEMENT 
In this chapter, I focus on the relation between retail trading and return comovement 
(Hypotheses 2 to 4). As argued before, the investor clientele-driven return 
comovement results from the correlated uninformed demand shocks for a particular 
group of securities, mainly from noise traders with correlated sentiment (Barberis, 
Shleifer and Wurgler, 2005; Greenwood, 2008). Since the retail investors are usually 
considered as uninformed noise traders, the institutional ownership-based excess 
return comovement could stem from retail trading.  
To formally test this intuition and be consistent with the previous analysis, I 
explicitly relate the cumulative change in return comovement of fire sale stocks to the 
trading behavior of retail investors (Hypothesis 2). Next, if the excess return 
comovement is driven by retail trading, on one hand, the stocks will comove even 
more in case of high retail concentration. I test the link between return comovement 
and stock as well as fund characteristics that proxy for the retail habitat or the 
familiarity to retail investors, i.e., stocks and funds favored by or familiar to 
individual investors (Hypothesis 3). On the other hand, the stocks will comove more 
during periods of high market uncertainty, when retail investors are exposed to more 
behavioral biases due to the opaque information environment. I also examine if the 
institutional ownership-based excess return comovement increases with market 
uncertainty (Hypothesis 4). 
5.1 Retail Trading on Fire Sale Stocks 
To capture the overall change in return comovement among fire sale stocks, I define 
the following proxy for cumulative change in return comovement:       
                        , where              and             are computed for stock   
in quarter   from Equation (3).  
I start with the portfolio analysis. Stocks are sorted into quintiles according to 
lagged cumulative change in return comovement in each quarter. For each stock, 
27 
 
proportional number of trades refers to the number of (small/med/large) trades scaled 
by the total number of trades on that stock per day, proportional trading volume 
refers to the volume of (small/med/large) trades scaled by the total trading volume on 
that stock per day. Small (retail) trade is defined as trade less than or equal to $5,000, 
large (institutional) trade is defined as trade greater than or equal to $50,000, and 
median trade consists the rest in between (Lee and Radhakrishna, 2000). The trade 
size is adjusted by the CPI based on real dollars at the beginning of 1991. Over the 
sample period from 1990 to 2000, average proportional number of trades and 
proportional trading volume are computed within each quintile, as well as the 
differences between quintiles with high or low cumulative change in return 
comovement (“High – Low”). 
As predicted by category or habitat view of return comovement and suggested in 
earlier empirical findings, the fire sale stocks comove more with the new institutional 
ownership category and comove less with the previous one, I hence focus on stocks 
with positive cumulative change in return comovement, and study how it is related to 
retail trading activities.  
The results are reported in Table 8. Panels A and B report average proportional 
number of trades and proportional trading volume, when cumulative change in return 
comovement is computed from equal-weighted and value-weighted ownership 
portfolio returns, respectively. Take equal-weighted results as an example. Portfolios 
of stocks characterized by high cumulative comovement change display 10.7% or 9% 
(18.9% or 19.2%) more retail trades and 5.7% or 16.7% (4.6% or 15.7%) less 
institutional trades than portfolios of stocks characterized by low cumulative 
comovement change, in terms of proportional number of trades or proportional 
trading volume, when stocks switch from “High” to “Med” (“Med” to “Low”) tercile. 
Since the small and large trades are defined according to the dollar trade size, one 
potential concern is that low-priced (high-priced) stocks are more likely to be 
classified as retail (institutional) trades, as well as related to more (less) comovement 
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change due to its high (low) retail concentration. This induces a mechanical positive 
(negative) relationship between retail (institutional) trades and comovement change. 
To address this concern, I apply a price filter to exclude stocks below 1 USD or 
above 50 USD. The (unreported) findings are qualitatively and quantitatively similar. 
For example, portfolios of stocks characterized by high equal-weighted cumulative 
comovement change display 8.2% or 7.7% more retail trades and 4.2% or 13.9% less 
institutional trades than portfolios of stocks characterized by low cumulative 
comovement change, in terms of proportional number of trades or proportional 
trading volume, when stocks switch from “High” to “Med” tercile. 
In line with the second hypothesis, this confirms that the excess return 
comovement within the same institutional ownership category is indeed associated 
with retail trading, and the impact is both statistically and economically significant. 
The retail trading activities provide an explicit channel through which they might 
generate excess return comovement. 
5.2 Retail Habitat and Return Comovement 
Next, I move on to test the relation between retail concentration and excess return 
comovement (Hypothesis 3). Kumar and Lee (2006) document that small, low priced 
firms, firms with low institutional ownership and value firms are related to strong 
retail concentrations and disproportionately high retail trading activities. To test 
whether the change in return comovement is enhanced in case of high retail 
concentration, I therefore estimate the following quarterly regression: 
                          , 0 , 1 , ,i q i q i qcM                                                      (8) 
where       refers to the cumulative change in return comovement of stock   in 
quarter  , and the vector   stacks firm characteristics, including the log(size), 
log(price), turnover ratio, log(Amihud illiquidity) and number of analyst following 
this firm. These variables are described in more detail in the Appendix. 
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In Table 9 Panel A, Models 1 to 4 present the results of Fama-MacBeth 
regressions and their corresponding Newey-West adjusted t-statistics, and Models 5 
to 8 present the results of pooled OLS regressions with clustered t-statistics at the 
firm level. All OLS regressions include time dummy for each quarter. The results 
suggest that the shift in return comovement is stronger for small stocks with low 
price. In Model 1, a one standard deviation lower Log (Size) is related to 1.475 higher 
cumulative comovement change,
13
 which amounts to 22.23% of the standard 
deviation of cumulative comovement change (6.638 in the full sample). For Log 
(Price) in Model 2, the impact is 0.716 in absolute magnitude, which amounts to 
10.79% of the standard deviation of cumulative comovement change in the sample. 
As a robustness check, the pooled OLS estimations with residuals clustered by firm 
provide similar results. 
As suggested in Table 8, the intensity of retail trading is one of the main 
determinants of the comovement change. In Table 9 Panel B, I further consider retail 
trading − Proportional Number of Small Trades and Proportional Volume of Small 
Trades in the multivariate regression, and focus on the subperiod with TAQ data 
before 2000. In line with the univariate result in Table 8, the retail trading intensity is 
indeed positively related to comovement change (Models 3, 4, 7 and 8), and the size 
and price effect remains significant in the pre-2000 subperiod (Models 1, 2, 5 and 6). 
Consistent with Hypothesis 3, the cumulative change in return comovement is more 
pronounced for stocks favored by retail investors, as they are more sensitive to 
shocks in retail demand or investor sentiment. This further verifies that the excess 
return comovement among stocks with similar institutional ownership is explained by 
retail investor habitat. 
Pirinsky and Wang (2006) argue that price formation in equity markets has a 
significant geographic component linked to the trading patterns of local residents, 
                                                          
13 For instance, the economic impact for firm size Log (Size) is quantified as                   , 
where       is the regression parameter of Log (Size) on cumulative change in return comovement and 
      is the standard deviation of Log (Size) for fire sale stocks (switch sample). 
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induced by familiarity and visibility of the firm in the local community. The same 
logic applies to the home bias in domestic institutional ownership, as retail investors 
might rely more on domestic financial analyst report and media coverage, and are 
less familiar with foreign institutions. Hitherto, the analysis only considers U.S. 
domestic funds, which refer to the funds whose domicile country is U.S. and invest in 
U.S. market. To investigate whether the change in return comovement is related to 
retail habitat, I compare the changes in holdings of different institution types, and 
further include international funds and foreign funds. International funds are those 
U.S.-domiciled funds investing globally, and foreign funds are those non U.S.-
domiciled funds investing in U.S. market. If the excess return comovement is driven 
by correlated trading of retail investors who are more familiar with domestic 
institutions, the impact of domestic (foreign) institutional ownership on return 
comovement is expected to be strongest (weakest). 
Given the significant shift in return comovement among domestic funds shown in 
Table 3, Table 10 suggests that this pattern does not hold among foreign funds. This 
confirms that the institutional ownership-based excess return comovement is driven 
by retail trading, especially for stocks favored by or familiar to retail investors, as 
predicted by Hypothesis 3. 
5.3 Market Uncertainty and Return Comovement 
Now I study the relation between market uncertainty and excess return comovement 
in time series (Hypothesis 4). Since investors are more likely to be prone to 
behavioral biases when market is highly uncertain (e.g., Daniel, Hirshleifer and 
Subrahmanyam, 1998, 2001; Hirshleifer, 2001; Kumar, 2009; Kumar, Page and Spalt, 
2013), the idea is to see whether the excess return comovement is also amplified 
during such time. Following Kumar, Page and Spalt (2013), market uncertainty is 
proxied by market volatility and investor sentiment. 
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To better relate excess return comovement to aggregate market conditions, I 
generalize the sample to all stocks, instead of limiting to fire sale stocks as before.
14
 
Return comovement is estimated from the following regressions for each stock in 
each quarter.
 
                       
, , , , , , , 1, , , 2, , ,
3, , , 4, , , , , ,
i t q i q IO i q IO t q i q t q i q t q
i q t q i q t q i t q
R R RMRF SMB
HML UMD
   
  
   
  
                        (9)                                                                                           
where        refers to the return of stock   on day   of quarter  ,         refers to the 
institutional ownership-weighted return,        ,       ,       and        refer 
to Fama-French-Carhart factors (market, size, book-to-market and momentum). Later, 
I construct a time-series measure of institutional ownership-based stock return 
comovement      , by taking average         across all stocks in that quarter. Then I 
estimate the following quarterly time-series regressions, 
 , 0 1 2 3 1 ,IO q q q q q qSENT VIX MktVol cM                               (10) 
where       refers to the average institutional ownership-based stock return 
comovement at quarter   defined as above,       refers to the average monthly 
Baker and Wurgler (2007) market sentiment index,      refers to the average 
monthly CBOE volatility index,        refers to market volatility (defined as the 
standard deviation of daily value-weighted market return in that quarter), and the 
vector   stacks all other control variables, including lag(βIO), lag(sentiment), 
lag(VIX), and lag(market volatility). 
I tabulate the results in Table 11. Panel A reports the regression parameters of 
Equation (10) as well as their corresponding Newey-West adjusted (Models 1 to 5) or 
clustered by time (Models 6 to 10) t-statistics, over the entire sample period from 
1990 to 2010. Panel B presents similar statistics when dependent variable in Equation 
(10) is replaced with         , by taking average            across all stocks in that 
                                                          
14 The (unreported) results provide similar evidence using the fire sale sample. 
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quarter. Similar to Equation (9),            is estimated from the following 
regressions in each quarter. 
              
, , , , , , , 1, , , 2, , ,
3, , , 4, , , , , ,
i t q i q LowIO i q LowIO t q i q t q i q t q
i q t q i q t q i t q
R R RMRF SMB
HML UMD
   
  
   
  
                (11) 
where            refers to the equal-weighted portfolio return of stocks with low 
(bottom tercile) institutional ownership on day   of quarter  , and other variables are 
defined the same as in Equation (9). Panel C reports the regression parameters and 
Newey-West adjusted t-statistics over the extended period from 1980 to 2010, where 
Models 1 to 5 use institutional ownership-weighted return similar to Panel A, and the 




The results show that the excess return comovement within similar institutional 
ownership category is amplified during periods of high market volatility, and this 
positive relation is robust to different models and specifications, as well as different 
sample periods. However, the investor sentiment only affects the excess return 
comovement with low institutional ownership stocks, most likely due to their high 
retail concentration and more retail trading. The comovement with low institutional 
ownership stocks is in spirit similar to the other two types of non fundamental-related 
comovement in Kumar, Page and Spalt (2013), and they find that return comovement 
with low price stocks and local stock increases during times of greater aggregate 
uncertainty and higher market sentiment. The market-level time-series evidence 
further supports the category or habitat view of return comovement, and the positive 
relation between market uncertainty and excess return comovement is in line with the 
conjecture in Hypothesis 4. 
  
                                                          
15 Since the VIX data starts from January 1990, Models 1, 4, 6 and 9 in Panel C still present results over 
the sample period from 1990 to 2010. 
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CHAPTER 6. INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP-BASED TRADING 
STRATEGIES 
As of now, I have shown that the institutional ownership-based excess return 
comovement supports the category or habitat view of return comovement, and 
institutional ownership shapes the investor clientele and trading habitat that is 
unrelated to the firm fundamental value. The common factor in retail demand shocks 
causes stock prices to move together, within the same institutional ownership 
category. I also provide confirmatory evidence that retail trading activities increase 
with the excess return comovement, especially for stocks favored by or familiar to 
retail investors, and during periods of high market uncertainty. 
The results presented before suggest that the retail investors form their trading 
habitat based on institutional ownership. In addition, Kaniel, Saar and Titman (2008) 
document the contrarian tendency of individual investors and they act as liquidity 
providers to institutions that require immediacy. This suggests that stocks that move 
from high to low institutional ownership involves retail investors absorbing these 
flow-driven shocks. In addition, the incentive for individual investors to provide 
liquidity depends on their ability or willingness as well as the overall market 
conditions. In this chapter, to better understand the relation between institutional 
ownership and retail trading, I investigate this incentive by studying the portfolio 
returns to investors, both unconditionally and conditional on market returns. I include 
all stocks that switch to a different institutional ownership category, and examine the 
impact of institutional ownership change on both short-term and long-term stock 
performance, by adopting a calendar-time portfolio approach. More specifically, in 
the short-term analysis, stocks are sorted into terciles according to lagged 
institutional ownership at the beginning of each quarter. Next, all stocks that switch 
to a lower (higher) tercile are identified in down (up) portfolios. Finally, in each 
quarter the portfolios are rebalanced and out of sample monthly returns are calculated. 
The portfolio returns are further adjusted by CAPM, Fama-French three-factor and 
34 
 
Fama-French-Carhart four-factor models. In the long-term analysis, I apply similar 
approach while skipping the most recent quarter, and hold the stocks for another six, 
nine and twelve months, respectively. 
I report the results in Table 12. Panel A reports short-term results on CAPM one-
factor, Fama-French three-factor, Fama-French-Carhart four-factor adjusted return 
for each portfolio, and the performance difference between up and down portfolios 
(“Up – Down”), over the entire sample period (full sample), as well as in the sub-
period (up and down). Market is defined to be up (down) market if lagged market 
return is non-negative (negative). Panel B reports long-term results on Fama-French-
Carhart four-factor adjusted return when skip the most recent quarter, and hold the 
stocks for another six, nine and twelve months, respectively, as well as the 
performance difference between down and up portfolios (“Down – Up”). In the 
quarter after institutional ownership change, stocks switch from “Med” to “High” 
tercile can deliver an annualized Fama-French-Carhart four-factor adjusted return of 
7.37%, and outperform those switch from “High” to “Med” tercile by 13.87% per 
year. Similarly, stocks switch from “Low” to “Med” tercile outperform those switch 
from “Med” to “Low” tercile by 11.7% per year. The results for CAPM one-factor 
and Fama-French three-factor adjusted return are qualitatively and quantitatively 
similar. The observed positive (negative) abnormal return following institutional 
buying (selling) implies a short-term price impact of institutional trading. However, if 
retail trading is associated with changes in institutional ownership as stated in 
previous results, the short-term price impact of institutional selling is expected to be 
absorbed by retail buying, particularly in the up market when investor sentiment is 
high. Indeed, I further show that the price impact induced by institutional selling is 
insignificant in the up market, and the result is robust to the switch between different 
categories, as well as multiple risk adjustments on stock performance.  
 The long-term portfolio results are consistent with the argument that retail 
investors prefer to hold stocks with low institutional ownership and provide liquidity 
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to institutional trading (Kumar and Lee, 2006; Kaniel, Saar and Titman, 2008). Retail 
buying generates positive abnormal return and outperforms retail selling, especially 
when institutional ownership falls to the bottom tercile during the periods of low 
market liquidity. For example, stocks switch from “Med” to “Low” tercile can 
deliver an annualized Fama-French-Carhart four-factor adjusted return of 9.16% 
within a six-month window, and outperform those switch from “Low” to “Med” 
tercile by 5.15% per year. The economic effect is more sizable in the down market. 
Stocks switch from “Med” to “Low” tercile can deliver an annualized Fama-French-
Carhart four-factor adjusted return of 14.56% within a six-month window, and 
outperform those switch from “Low” to “Med” tercile by 10.01% per year. Similarly, 
in a twelve-month holding period, stocks switch from “Med” to “Low” tercile can 
deliver an annualized Fama-French-Carhart four-factor adjusted return of 8.04% 
(10.58% in down market), and outperform those switch from “Low” to “Med” tercile 
by 3.32% (7.97% in down market) per year. 
To conclude, two profitable trading strategies can be developed as follows: a 
short-term strategy of long (short) stocks with increase (decrease) in institutional 
ownership; a long-term strategy of long (short) stocks with decrease (increase) in 
institutional ownership. This is also in support of the intuition that retail investors 
respond to the changes in institutional ownership, and their trading activities 




CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION 
In traditional asset pricing theory, the comovement of stock prices is driven by 
changes in their fundamental values and not the ownership composition. However, in 
an economy with market frictions and irrational investors, institutional ownership 
does generate excess return comovement. This study provides evidence that excess 
return comovement among stocks with similar levels of institutional ownership is 
consistent with a behavioral view of comovement, where the commonality in investor 
clientele and the consequent correlated demand shocks as well as investor sentiment 
lead to excess return comovement. 
To establish a causal effect of institutional ownership on return comovement, I 
use three natural experiments to identify exogenous changes in institutional 
ownership but not firm fundamentals: (a) mutual fund fire sales (Coval and Stafford, 
2007); (b) mutual fund closure (Zhao, 2005) and (c) mutual fund trading scandal 
(Ferris and Yan, 2007; Qian and Tanyeri, 2011; Antón and Polk, 2013). I find that 
stocks switch from high to low institutional ownership category comove more with 
other low institutional ownership stocks and comove less with high institutional 
ownership stocks. This finding withstands a number of robustness checks, and 
supports the category or habitat view of return comovement. 
I also find that the excess comovement within the same institutional ownership 
category increases with retail trading, especially for stocks favored by or familiar to 
retail investors, such as small stocks with low price, stocks with high retail trading 
intensity, and stocks held by domestic mutual funds. This institutional ownership-
based return comovement is also amplified during periods of high market uncertainty. 
Considering a general relationship between ownership composition and investor 
behavior, I develop two profitable trading strategies based on changes in institutional 
ownership: a short-term strategy of long (short) stocks with increase (decrease) in 
institutional ownership; a long-term strategy of long (short) stocks with decrease 
(increase) in institutional ownership. Moreover, the short-term price impact of 
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institutional selling is absorbed by retail buying in the up market when investor 
sentiment is high, and in the long run retail investors provide liquidity to institutional 
trading, especially in the down market when market liquidity is low.  
The overall results suggest that institutional ownership is an important firm 
characteristic in shaping the investor clientele and the consequent excess return 
comovement. In addition, a proper understanding of retail trading behavior could 
greatly improve our knowledge regarding the role of retail investors in return 
comovement. These findings add to a growing literature that emphasizes that return 
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Appendix: Variable Definitions 
 
Variables Definitions 
A. Stock Characteristics 
IO Institutional ownership in a given quarter   is computed as follows: 
      ∑        , where        is the investment weight of stock   in 
fund   in quarter  . 
 
 
Log (Size) The logarithm of average monthly market capitalization of stocks in a 
quarter, computed as month-end stock price multiplied by the shares 
outstanding as reported in CRSP, in millions. 
 
 
Log (Price) The logarithm of average month-end stock price in a quarter, as 
reported in CRSP.  
Turnover (in %) The average daily turnover in a quarter, computed as:  
            (∑                        )  , where          is the 
volume of stock   on day   of quarter  ,             is the shares 
outstanding at the same time,   is the number of days for which data 





Log (Amihud) The logarithm of average daily Amihud illiquidity in a quarter,  
          (∑ |      |             )  , where        is the return of 
stock   on day   of quarter  ,           is the volume in dollars at the 
same time,   is the number of days for which data are available in that 









Num_AnalystRec The number of analyst following this firm as reported in I/B/E/S in 
each quarter.  
B. Fund Characteristics 
Flow (in %) Fund flow in a given month   is computed as follows:  
       [              (     )]        ,  
where       is the total net asset of fund   in month , and     is 




C. Market Characteristics 
VIX The average monthly volatility index in each quarter, as reported by 
Chicago Board of Options Exchange (CBOE).  
Market Volatility The standard deviation of daily value-weighted market return in each 
quarter.  
BWSENT The average monthly Baker and Wurgler (2007) market sentiment 





Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
This table presents the summary statistics for data used in the thesis between 1990 
and 2010. Panel A reports the mean, median, standard deviation, and the quantile 
distribution of quarterly stock and fund characteristics, as well as macroeconomic 
proxies. Panel B reports similar statistics of changes in stock return comovement. 
Panel C reports the correlation among the main variables. The Appendix provides the 
detailed definition of each variable. 
 
Panel A: Quantile Distribution of Stock Characteristics and Other Controls 
 Mean Std.Dev. 
Quantile Distribution 
 
10% 25% Median 75% 90% 
A1: Stock Characteristics (Full Sample) 
IO (in %) 11.227 10.731 0.346 2.204 8.108 17.644 27.077 
∆IO (in %) -0.098 3.353 -2.938 -0.717 0.000 0.778 2.740 
Log (Size) 5.402 1.935 3.026 3.993 5.244 6.681 8.029 
Log (Price) 2.467 1.115 0.916 1.808 2.657 3.280 3.738 
Turnover (in %) 0.629 0.753 0.089 0.174 0.368 0.781 1.465 
Log (Amihud) -2.901 3.121 -7.095 -5.255 -2.849 -0.517 1.157 
Num_AnalystRec 3.740 4.916 0.000 0.000 2.000 5.000 11.000 
A2: Stock Characteristics (Switch Sample) 
IO (in %) 8.901 5.798 1.905 3.314 8.486 12.388 18.210 
∆IO (in %) -5.121 4.897 -11.086 -6.843 -3.694 -1.802 -0.800 
Log (Size) 5.795 1.742 3.691 4.613 5.641 6.844 8.120 
Log (Price) 2.523 1.007 1.191 1.946 2.648 3.239 3.701 
Turnover (in %) 1.029 1.305 0.176 0.328 0.662 1.268 2.307 
Log (Amihud) -3.974 2.652 -7.364 -5.787 -4.050 -2.226 -0.395 
Num_AnalystRec 4.943 4.940 0.000 1.000 4.000 7.000 12.000 
A3: Fund Characteristics 
Flow (in %) 1.868 9.409 -2.697 -1.256 -0.001 2.088 6.699 
A4: Market Characteristics 
VIX 20.419 7.701 12.456 14.157 19.637 24.731 27.691 
Market Volatility 0.010 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.008 0.012 0.016 
BWSENT 0.065 0.535 -0.375 -0.211 -0.048 0.175 0.589 




10% 25% Median 75% 90% 
B1: Equal-weighted 
High to Med 
∆βMedIO 0.629 3.653 -3.497 -1.378 0.448 2.384 4.913 
∆βHighIO -0.596 3.027 -4.169 -2.087 -0.415 1.039 2.811 
Med to Low 
∆βLowIO 0.478 3.778 -3.571 -1.336 0.245 2.060 4.735 
∆βMedIO -0.471 3.299 -4.084 -1.934 -0.268 1.133 2.952 
High to Low 
∆βLowIO 1.039 5.077 -3.046 -0.963 0.487 1.848 5.519 
∆βHighIO -1.076 3.920 -3.939 -1.676 -0.345 0.495 1.954 
Cumulative Change ∆β 1.125 6.638 -6.212 -2.384 0.766 4.182 8.833 
B2: Value-weighted 
High to Med 
∆βMedIO 0.244 2.395 -2.521 -1.016 0.219 1.486 2.984 
∆βHighIO -0.277 2.172 -2.800 -1.361 -0.219 0.869 2.100 
Med to Low 
∆βLowIO 0.087 2.394 -2.578 -1.083 0.017 1.172 2.844 
∆βMedIO -0.156 2.145 -2.682 -1.168 -0.061 0.989 2.199 
High to Low 
∆βLowIO 0.330 2.909 -2.369 -1.219 -0.039 1.392 3.627 
∆βHighIO -0.506 2.394 -2.970 -1.180 -0.252 0.658 1.742 







Panel C: Correlation among Institutional Ownership, Return Comovement and Controls (Switch Sample) 
 
IO ∆IO ∆β Log (Size) Log (Price) Turnover Log (Amihud) 
∆IO 0.004 1.000 
  
   
∆β -0.002 -0.028 1.000 
 
   
Log (Size) 0.413 -0.038 -0.068 1.000    
Log (Price) 0.267 -0.014 -0.088 0.716 1.000   
Turnover 0.067 -0.105 0.015 0.045 -0.002 1.000  
Log (Amihud) -0.470 0.117 0.041 -0.907 -0.632 -0.146 1.000 
Num_AnalystRec 0.374 -0.061 0.003 0.668 0.318 0.100 -0.677 
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Table 2: Institutional Ownership-based Stock Return Comovement 
 
Panels A and B report the average institutional ownership-based stock return 
comovement. At the beginning of each quarter, stocks are sorted into terciles 
according to lagged institutional ownership. For each stock with non-zero 
institutional ownership, return comovement is estimated from the following 
univariate or bivariate regressions in each quarter. Panel A presents the average 
parameters (       ) of the following univariate regressions within each tercile, as well 
as the differences between terciles with high or low institutional ownership (“High – 
Low”). 
Baseline:                                  , 
Baseline + CAPM:                                                , 
Baseline + Fama-French-Carhart:                                          
                                             , 
where        refers to the return of stock   on day   of quarter  ,         refers to the 
institutional ownership-weighted return,        ,       ,        and        refer 
to Fama-French-Carhart factors (market, size, book-to-market and momentum). Panel 
B reports similar statistics of the following bivariate regressions. 
Baseline:                                                               ,  
Baseline + CAPM:                                                         
                    ,  
Baseline + Fama-French-Carhart: 
                                                                      
                                             ,  
where            and             refer to the equal-weighted (or value-weighted) 
portfolio return on day   of quarter  , for stocks with low (bottom tercile) and high 
(top tercile) institutional ownership, respectively. Panels C and D report similar 
statistics when further control for the impact of firm size. At the beginning of each 
quarter, stocks are first sorted into quintiles according to lagged market capitalization, 
and then within each size quintile stocks are sorted into terciles according to lagged 
institutional ownership (following Pirinsky and Wang, 2004). Numbers with “*”, “**” 








Panel A: Level of Institutional Ownership and Return Comovement (Single-Sort, Univariate) 
IO Baseline Baseline + CAPM Baseline + Fama-French-Carhart 
Low 0.658 0.805 0.677 
Med 0.861 0.877 0.615 
High 1.035 0.961 0.818 
High – Low 0.377*** 0.156*** 0.141** 
  (25.38) (5.42) (2.08) 
Panel B: Level of Institutional Ownership and Return Comovement (Single-Sort, Bivariate) 
IO 
Baseline Baseline + CAPM Baseline + Fama-French-Carhart 
βLowIO βHighIO βLowIO βHighIO βLowIO βHighIO 
B1: Equal-weighted 
     
Low 0.937 0.044 0.932 0.047 0.927 0.025 
Med 0.349 0.603 0.343 0.578 0.282 0.234 
High 0.005 0.991 0.005 0.989 0.003 0.980 
High – Low -0.932*** 0.948*** -0.927*** 0.943*** -0.923*** 0.955*** 
 
(17.33) (21.70) (17.22) (21.45) (16.12) (15.27) 
B2: Value-weighted 
     Low 0.503 0.153 0.552 0.392 0.349 -0.106 
Med 0.416 0.437 0.400 0.551 0.118 -0.019 
High 0.262 0.725 0.305 1.046 0.015 0.476 
High – Low -0.242*** 0.571*** -0.247*** 0.653*** -0.334*** 0.583*** 
  (19.75) (20.53) (20.18) (19.60) (10.85) (5.12) 
Panel C: Level of Institutional Ownership and Return Comovement (Conditional on Size, Univariate) 
IO Baseline Baseline + CAPM Baseline + Fama-French-Carhart 
Low 0.782 0.778 0.456 
Med 0.855 0.872 0.676 
High 0.918 0.992 0.976 
High – Low 0.136*** 0.214*** 0.519*** 
 
(11.22) (8.52) (9.72) 
Panel D: Level of Institutional Ownership and Return Comovement (Conditional on Size, Bivariate) 
IO 
Baseline Baseline + CAPM Baseline + Fama-French-Carhart 
βLowIO βHighIO βLowIO βHighIO βLowIO βHighIO 
D1: Equal-weighted 
     
Low 0.912 0.075 0.907 0.068 0.901 0.047 
Med 0.424 0.563 0.404 0.524 0.343 0.383 
High 0.022 0.978 0.020 0.972 0.018 0.945 
High – Low -0.890*** 0.903*** -0.886*** 0.904*** -0.883*** 0.898*** 
 
(19.14) (22.57) (18.75) (21.77) (17.60) (18.69) 
D2: Value-weighted 
     Low 0.063 0.593 -0.320 0.332 0.033 -0.091 
Med -0.017 0.722 -0.502 0.388 -0.140 -0.038 
High -0.124 0.858 -0.368 0.685 -0.037 0.240 
High – Low -0.186* 0.265*** -0.048*** 0.354*** -0.070** 0.332*** 
 
(-1.84) (46.01) (-14.17) (19.97) (-2.52) (2.65) 
47 
 
Table 3: Institutional Ownership-based Stock Return Comovement: 
Mutual Fund Fire Sales 
 
This table reports the average changes in stock return comovement around 
institutional ownership change. At the beginning of each quarter, stocks are sorted 
into terciles according to lagged institutional ownership. For each fire sale stock that 
switches to a different tercile, return comovement is estimated from the following 
bivariate regressions, separately for one quarter before and after the switch. 
Baseline:                                                                   , 
Baseline + CAPM:                                                             
                    , 
Baseline + Fama-French-Carhart: 
                                                                          
                                             , 
where        refers to the return of stock   on day   of quarter  ,              and 
              refer to the equal-weighted (or value-weighted) portfolio return for stocks 
with different levels of institutional ownership (Low, Med and High) before and after 
the switch, respectively,        ,       ,        and        refer to Fama-
French-Carhart factors (market, size, book-to-market and momentum). Panel A 
reports the average change (e.g.,                                    ) as well as 
Newey-West adjusted t-statistics in return comovement using baseline model, when 
ownership portfolio returns are equal-weighted or value-weighted. Panel B reports 
similar equal-weighted statistics when further control for CAPM and Fama-French-
Carhart four factors. Numbers with “*”, “**” and “***” are significant at the 10%, 5% 






Panel A: Institutional Ownership-based Comovement Change (Baseline Model) 
∆IO Sample Period 
Equal-weighted Value-weighted 
∆βLowIO ∆βMedIO ∆βHighIO ∆βLowIO ∆βMedIO ∆βHighIO 
High to Med 























  (9.46) (-10.41)   (4.70) (-5.75) 
Med to Low 




















 (7.15) (-8.24)   (1.91) (-2.69)   
High to Low 






























(-2.65) (2.28)   (-2.94) 
Panel B: Institutional Ownership-based Comovement Change (Control for Fundamentals) 
∆IO Sample Period 
Baseline + CAPM Baseline + Fama-French-Carhart 
∆βLowIO ∆βMedIO ∆βHighIO ∆βLowIO ∆βMedIO ∆βHighIO 
High to Med 























  (9.35) (-10.79)   (6.95) (-9.59) 
Med to Low 




















 (6.70) (-6.23)   (7.50) (-7.70)   
High to Low 




























(1.90)   (-2.62) (1.93)   (-2.13) 
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Table 4: Alternative Exogenous Shocks: Mutual Fund Closure and 
Trading Scandal 
  
This table reports the average changes in stock return comovement around 
institutional ownership change. At the beginning of each quarter, stocks are sorted 
into terciles according to lagged institutional ownership. For each stock involved in 
an exogenous demand shock during the last quarter and switches to a different tercile, 
return comovement is estimated from the following bivariate regressions, separately 
for one quarter before and after the switch. 
Baseline:                                                                   , 
Baseline + CAPM:                                                             
                    , 
Baseline + Fama-French-Carhart: 
                                                                          
                                             , 
where        refers to the return of stock   on day   of quarter  ,              and 
              refer to the equal-weighted (or value-weighted) portfolio return for stocks 
with different levels of institutional ownership (Low, Med and High) before and after 
the switch, respectively,        ,       ,        and        refer to Fama-
French-Carhart factors (market, size, book-to-market and momentum). Panel A1 
considers the case of mutual fund closure, that is, for each stock held by at least one 
mutual fund that is liquidated during the last quarter and switches to a different 
institutional ownership tercile, I report the average change as well as Newey-West 
adjusted t-statistics in return comovement using baseline model, when ownership 
portfolio returns are equal-weighted or value-weighted. Panel A2 reports similar 
statistics for stocks held by at least one mutual fund whose fund family is announced 
to be investigated in the mutual fund trading scandal between 2003 and 2004. Panels 
B1 and B2 report similar equal-weighted statistics when further control for CAPM 
and Fama-French-Carhart four factors. Numbers with “*”, “**” and “***” are 






Panel A: Institutional Ownership-based Comovement Change (Baseline Model) 
∆IO Sample Period 
Equal-weighted Value-weighted 
∆βLowIO ∆βMedIO ∆βHighIO ∆βLowIO ∆βMedIO ∆βHighIO 
Panel A1: Mutual Fund Closure 
      
High to Med 
1990 – 1999 
 0.356* -0.375** 0.274* -0.326*** 
 (1.80) (-2.21)  (2.01) (-2.77) 
2000 – 2010 
 0.388*** -0.363***  0.246*** -0.232*** 
 (5.56) (-5.54)  (4.46) (-4.77) 
Full Sample 
 0.373*** -0.368***  0.259*** -0.275*** 
 (3.81) (-4.34)  (3.76) (-4.58) 
Med to Low 
1990 – 1999 
0.918** -0.923**   0.310* -0.458***   
(2.33) (-2.57)  (1.96) (-3.40)  
2000 – 2010 
0.439* -0.516*  0.031 -0.197*  
(1.98) (-2.02)  (0.27) (-1.83)  
Full Sample 
0.656*** -0.701***  0.157 -0.315***  
(3.00) (-3.25)   (1.58) (-3.51)   
Panel A2: Mutual Fund Trading Scandal 
     









Panel B: Institutional Ownership-based Comovement Change (Control for Fundamentals) 
∆IO Sample Period 
Baseline + CAPM Baseline + Fama-French-Carhart 
∆βLowIO ∆βMedIO ∆βHighIO ∆βLowIO ∆βMedIO ∆βHighIO 
Panel B1: Mutual Fund Closure 
      
High to Med 
1990 – 1999 
 0.436** -0.538** 0.480*** -0.429** 
 (2.21) (-2.34)  (2.90) (-2.08) 
2000 – 2010 
 0.354*** -0.365***  0.285*** -0.547*** 
 (4.95) (-5.02)  (3.99) (-5.53) 
Full Sample 
 0.391*** -0.445***  0.375*** -0.493*** 
 (3.98) (-3.94)  (4.27) (-4.55) 
Med to Low 
1990 – 1999 
0.774** -0.574   0.787** -0.206   
(2.42) (-1.48)  (2.19) (-0.40)  
2000 – 2010 
0.564* -0.678  0.663* -1.263**  
(2.01) (-1.45)  (1.94) (-2.10)  
Full Sample 
0.659*** -0.630**  0.719*** -0.784*  
(3.16) (-2.05)   (2.92) (-1.87)   
Panel B2: Mutual Fund Trading Scandal 
     












Table 5: Institutional Ownership-based Stock Return Comovement 
Relative to Matching Firms 
 
This table reports the average changes in stock return comovement around 
institutional ownership change, relative to changes in the same estimates for matching 
firms. At the beginning of each quarter, stocks are sorted into terciles according to 
lagged institutional ownership. Each fire sale stock switches to a different tercile is 
matched with another stock in the same industry, same size decile (within industry), 
same institutional ownership tercile, closest fire sale amount over the quarter before 
the switch, but does not switch to a different ownership tercile. For each fire sale 
stock   switches to a different tercile and its respective matching firm   , return 
comovement is estimated from the following bivariate regression, separately for one 
quarter before and after the switch time. 
                                                                  , 
                                                                        , 
where        refers to the return of stock   on day   of quarter  ,              and 
              refer to the equal-weighted (or value-weighted) portfolio return for stocks 
with different levels of institutional ownership (Low, Med and High) before and after 
the switch, respectively. This table reports the average differences in comovement 
change between stocks switch to a different tercile and matching stocks (e.g., 
 (           )                           (                       )  
                           ), as well as their Newey-West adjusted t-statistics, when 
ownership portfolio returns are equal-weighted or value-weighted. Numbers with “*”, 
“**” and “***” are significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Institutional Ownership-based Comovement Change Relative to Matching Firms 
∆IO Sample Period 
Equal-weighted Value-weighted 
∆(∆βLowIO) ∆(∆βMedIO) ∆(∆βHighIO) ∆(∆βLowIO) ∆(∆βMedIO) ∆(∆βHighIO) 
High to Med 























  (6.81) (-7.50)   (2.91) (-4.41) 
Med to Low 




















 (3.52) (-3.10)   (2.67) (-2.95)   
High to Low 
































Table 6: Institutional Ownership-based Stock Return Comovement: 
Other Robustness Checks 
 
This table reports the average changes in stock return comovement around 
institutional ownership change. At the beginning of each quarter, stocks are sorted 
into terciles according to lagged institutional ownership. For each fire sale stock that 
switches to a different tercile, return comovement is estimated from the following 
bivariate regression, separately for one quarter before and after the switch.  
                                                                  , 
where        refers to the return of stock   on day   of quarter  ,              and 
              refer to the equal-weighted (or value-weighted) portfolio return for stocks 
with different levels of institutional ownership (Low, Med and High) before and after 
the switch, respectively. Panel A only includes fire sale stocks originally stay in the 
bottom tercile, and reports average change as well as Newey-West adjusted t-
statistics in return comovement, when ownership portfolio returns are equal-weighted 
or value-weighted. Panels B to D report similar statistics in various sub-samples. In 
Panel B, leading stocks with below median return among all stocks in the last quarter 
are excluded. A leading stock is defined as the stock where the fund puts its largest 
investment weight according to the most updated holding information of the fund. In 
Panel C, fire sale stocks are defined as those with net extreme holding change in 
bottom decile, and in Panel D, fire sale stocks are defined as those with net extreme 
holding change accounts for at least fifty percent of the total ownership change. 
Numbers with “*”, “**” and “***” are significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, 
respectively. 
 
Panel A: Fire Sale Stocks in Bottom Tercile 
IO Sample Period 
Equal-weighted Value-weighted 
∆βLowIO ∆βMedIO ∆βHighIO ∆βLowIO ∆βMedIO ∆βHighIO 
Low 




















 (-0.24) (-0.12)   (-0.61) (0.64)   
Panel B: Exclude Leading Stocks with Low Past Return 
∆IO Sample Period 
Equal-weighted Value-weighted 
∆βLowIO ∆βMedIO ∆βHighIO ∆βLowIO ∆βMedIO ∆βHighIO 
High to Med 























  (9.89) (-10.71)   (4.66) (-5.80) 
Med to Low 

























Panel C: Net Extreme Holding Change in Bottom Decile 
∆IO Sample Period 
Equal-weighted Value-weighted 
∆βLowIO ∆βMedIO ∆βHighIO ∆βLowIO ∆βMedIO ∆βHighIO 
High to Med 























  (8.38) (-9.48)   (3.10) (-4.43) 
Med to Low 




















 (4.81) (-5.42)   (1.20) (-1.63)   
Panel D: Net Extreme Holding Change No Less than 50% of Total Ownership Change 
∆IO Sample Period 
Equal-weighted Value-weighted 
∆βLowIO ∆βMedIO ∆βHighIO ∆βLowIO ∆βMedIO ∆βHighIO 
High to Med 
1990 – 1999 
 0.926*** -0.802***  0.188 -0.240* 
 (3.95) (-4.60)  (1.38) (-1.89) 
2000 – 2010 
 0.545** -0.529***  0.231* -0.243** 
 (2.53) (-3.15)  (2.01) (-2.46) 
Full Sample 
 0.726*** -0.658***  0.211** -0.241*** 
 (4.40) (-5.26)  (2.35) (-3.03) 
Med to Low 
1990 – 1999 
0.559*** -0.432**   0.210 -0.167   
(3.34) (-2.30)  (1.00) (-0.96)  
2000 – 2010 
0.401 -0.343*  0.097 -0.163  
(1.42) (-1.98)  (0.52) (-0.83)  
Full Sample 
0.476*** -0.385***  0.150 -0.165  




Table 7: Institutional Ownership-based Stock Return Comovement: 
Information Diffusion Effects 
 
This table reports the average changes in stock return comovement around 
institutional ownership change. At the beginning of each quarter, stocks are sorted 
into terciles according to lagged institutional ownership. For each fire sale stock that 
switches to a different tercile, return comovement is estimated from the following 
bivariate regression, separately for one quarter before and after the switch.  
            ∑                          
 
     ∑                            
 
     
      , 
where        refers to the return of stock   on day   of quarter  ,                and 
                refer to the equal-weighted (or value-weighted) portfolio return for 
stocks with different levels of institutional ownership (Low, Med and High) before 
and after the switch, respectively, and   is the number of days before or after day  . 
The total return comovement is defined as the sum of lag, contemporaneous and lead 
beta coefficients as follows:  
           ∑            
 
    , 
            ∑             
 
    . 
Panel A reports average changes in total return comovement, the individual lag, 
contemporaneous and lead beta coefficients, as well as their Newey-West adjusted t-
statistics, when     and ownership portfolio returns are equal-weighted (Panel A1) 
or value-weighted (Panel A2). Panel B reports similar statistics when    . 







Panel A: Institutional Ownership-based Comovement Change with One Lead and Lag 
∆IO Sample Period 
∆βLowIO ∆βMedIO ∆βHighIO 
[t−1, t+1] t−1 t t+1 [t−1, t+1] t−1 t t+1 [t−1, t+1] t−1 t t+1 
Panel A1: Equal-weighted 
            
High to Med 
1990 – 1999 
    
0.769*** 0.046 0.703*** 0.020 -0.675*** -0.046 -0.675*** 0.046 
    
(5.33) (0.37) (7.34) (0.33) (-5.62) (-0.45) (-7.99) (0.83) 
2000 – 2010 
    
0.626*** -0.071 0.639*** 0.058 -0.652*** 0.010 -0.586*** -0.076 
    
(4.76) (-0.84) (11.38) (0.77) (-5.56) (0.15) (-12.00) (-1.25) 
Full Sample 
    
0.693*** -0.016 0.669*** 0.040 -0.663*** -0.016 -0.628*** -0.019 
    
(7.01) (-0.22) (12.19) (0.81) (-7.88) (-0.27) (-12.92) (-0.43) 
Med to Low 
1990 – 1999 
0.570*** 0.008 0.637*** -0.075 -0.530*** -0.068 -0.612*** 0.151         
(2.72) (0.08) (5.87) (-0.43) (-2.71) (-0.59) (-6.12) (0.94) 
    
2000 – 2010 
0.667*** 0.196* 0.414*** 0.057 -0.669*** -0.193*** -0.395*** -0.080 
    (4.16) (1.91) (3.43) (0.39) (-3.84) (-3.16) (-4.14) (-0.75) 
    
Full Sample 
0.620*** 0.105 0.521*** -0.007 -0.602*** -0.133** -0.500*** 0.031 
    (4.75) (1.41) (6.13) (-0.06) (-4.63) (-2.03) (-6.85) (0.32) 
    Panel A2: Value-weighted 
            
High to Med 
1990 – 1999 
    
0.114 -0.058 0.215*** -0.043 -0.148 0.063 -0.280*** 0.069 
    
(1.08) (-1.22) (3.76) (-0.87) (-1.63) (1.45) (-5.04) (1.39) 
2000 – 2010 
    
0.212 -0.052 0.224*** 0.040 -0.282** 0.028 -0.240*** -0.070 
    
(1.51) (-0.73) (2.87) (0.63) (-2.39) (0.47) (-3.67) (-1.15) 
Full Sample 
    
0.166* -0.055 0.220*** 0.001 -0.219*** 0.044 -0.259*** -0.005 
    
(1.86) (-1.25) (4.44) (0.03) (-2.86) (1.17) (-5.91) (-0.11) 
Med to Low 
1990 – 1999 
0.299 -0.053 0.299* 0.052 -0.417** -0.035 -0.300** -0.082         
(1.52) (-0.52) (1.82) (0.89) (-2.63) (-0.44) (-2.49) (-1.37) 
    
2000 – 2010 
0.101 0.030 0.056 0.015 -0.247* -0.056 -0.151 -0.039 
    (0.80) (0.42) (0.58) (0.18) (-1.90) (-0.84) (-1.60) (-0.50) 
    
Full Sample 
0.196* -0.010 0.173* 0.033 -0.329*** -0.046 -0.223*** -0.060 






Panel B: Institutional Ownership-based Comovement Change with Three Leads and Lags 
∆IO Sample Period 
∆βLowIO ∆βMedIO ∆βHighIO 
[t−3, t+3] [t−3, t−1] t [t+1, t+3] [t−3, t+3] [t−3, t−1] t [t+1, t+3] [t−3, t+3] [t−3, t−1] t [t+1, t+3] 
Panel B1: Equal-weighted 
            
High to Med 
1990 – 1999 
    
0.216 -0.318** 0.714*** -0.181 -0.242 0.261** -0.672*** 0.168 
    
(0.78) (-2.16) (6.47) (-0.96) (-0.95) (2.25) (-7.10) (1.03) 
2000 – 2010 
    
0.852*** -0.075 0.717*** 0.210 -0.888*** -0.055 -0.658*** -0.174 
    
(4.18) (-0.49) (10.83) (0.96) (-4.53) (-0.49) (-12.14) (-0.99) 
Full Sample 
    
0.554*** -0.189* 0.716*** 0.027 -0.585*** 0.093 -0.665*** -0.014 
    
(3.09) (-1.75) (11.30) (0.18) (-3.43) (1.07) (-12.48) (-0.11) 
Med to Low 
1990 – 1999 
0.774** 0.075 0.664*** 0.035 -0.609** -0.055 -0.603*** 0.048         
(2.45) (0.40) (5.67) (0.16) (-2.16) (-0.29) (-5.67) (0.27) 
    
2000 – 2010 
0.637*** 0.244 0.460*** -0.067 -0.544** -0.206 -0.398*** 0.060 
    (2.81) (1.44) (3.56) (-0.26) (-2.57) (-1.42) (-4.38) (0.36) 
    
Full Sample 
0.703*** 0.163 0.558*** -0.018 -0.575*** -0.133 -0.496*** 0.054 
    (3.69) (1.29) (6.16) (-0.11) (-3.32) (-1.09) (-6.74) (0.45) 
    Panel B2: Value-weighted 
            
High to Med 
1990 – 1999 
    
-0.122 -0.224** 0.223*** -0.121 0.067 0.222*** -0.275*** 0.120 
    
(-0.93) (-2.27) (3.42) (-1.25) (0.64) (2.92) (-4.43) (1.40) 
2000 – 2010 
    
0.032 -0.169 0.192** 0.009 -0.147 0.121 -0.209** -0.058 
    
(0.17) (-1.32) (2.19) (0.11) (-0.94) (1.20) (-2.62) (-0.89) 
Full Sample 
    
-0.040 -0.195** 0.206*** -0.052 -0.046 0.168** -0.240*** 0.025 
    
(-0.34) (-2.35) (3.69) (-0.83) (-0.47) (2.57) (-4.61) (0.45) 
Med to Low 
1990 – 1999 
0.443 -0.042 0.322** 0.164 -0.522** -0.074 -0.340*** -0.109         
(1.62) (-0.24) (2.08) (1.52) (-2.59) (-0.52) (-2.96) (-1.11) 
    
2000 – 2010 
0.341* 0.230** -0.017 0.128 -0.369 -0.163 -0.074 -0.132 
    (1.76) (2.33) (-0.16) (0.86) (-1.63) (-1.46) (-0.71) (-0.83) 
    
Full Sample 
0.390** 0.099 0.146 0.145 -0.443*** -0.120 -0.202** -0.121 




Table 8: Small and Large Trades in Single-Sorted Stock Portfolios 
 
In this table, stocks are sorted into quintiles according to cumulative change in return 
comovement in each quarter. Over the sample period from 1990 to 2000, average 
proportional number of trades and proportional trading volume are computed within 
each quintile, as well as the differences between quintiles with high or low 
cumulative change in return comovement (“High – Low”). For each stock, 
proportional number of trades refers to the number of (small/med/large) trades scaled 
by the total number of trades on that stock per day, proportional trading volume refers 
to the volume of (small/med/large) trades scaled by the total trading volume on that 
stock per day. Small trade is defined as trade less than or equal to $5,000, large trade 
is defined as trade greater than or equal to $50,000, and median trade consists the rest 
in between. The trade size is adjusted by the Consumer Price Index (CPI) based on 
real dollars at the beginning of 1991. Cumulative change in return comovement 
                               is computed in each quarter as follows. At the 
beginning of each quarter, stocks are sorted into terciles according to lagged 
institutional ownership. For each fire sale stock that switches to a different tercile, 
return comovement is estimated from the following bivariate regression, separately 
for one quarter before and after the switch.  
                                                                  , 
where        refers to the return of stock   on day   of quarter  ,              and 
              refer to the equal-weighted (or value-weighted) portfolio return for stocks 
with different levels of institutional ownership (Low, Med and High) before and after 
the switch, respectively. Only stocks with positive       are included in the portfolios. 
Panels A and B report average proportional number of trades and proportional trading 
volume as well as Newey-West adjusted t-statistics, when cumulative change in 
return comovement is computed from equal-weighted or value-weighted ownership 
portfolio returns. Numbers with “*”, “**” and “***” are significant at the 10%, 5% 








Panel A: Sorted by Institutional Ownership-based Cumulative Comovement (Equal-weighted) 
∆IO ∆β 
Proportional Number of Trades 
 
Proportional Trading Volume 
Small Med Large 
 
Small Med Large 
High to Med 
Q1 (Low) 0.363*** 0.506*** 0.130*** 
 
0.097*** 0.402*** 0.482*** 
 
(24.03) (57.44) (15.55) 
 
(12.20) (32.47) (21.09) 
Q2 0.360*** 0.517*** 0.120*** 
 
0.093*** 0.410*** 0.460*** 
 
(23.76) (55.95) (16.66) 
 
(11.04) (39.74) (26.87) 
Q3 0.402*** 0.497*** 0.099*** 
 
0.114*** 0.445*** 0.419*** 
 
(32.06) (56.60) (19.13) 
 
(14.05) (48.71) (27.38) 
Q4 0.424*** 0.491*** 0.084*** 
 
0.131*** 0.476*** 0.373*** 
 
(28.68) (47.61) (14.65) 
 
(13.46) (42.07) (20.18) 
Q5 (High) 0.470*** 0.456*** 0.073*** 
 
0.186*** 0.474*** 0.315*** 
 
(25.88) (32.77) (12.47) 
 
(11.15) (45.15) (17.34) 
High – Low 0.107*** -0.049*** -0.057*** 
 
0.090*** 0.072*** -0.167*** 
  (4.52) (-2.99) (-5.58) 
 
(4.85) (4.43) (-5.72) 
Med to Low 
Q1 (Low) 0.467*** 0.463*** 0.070*** 
 
0.200*** 0.504*** 0.284*** 
 
(19.84) (25.97) (7.64) 
 
(9.02) (35.29) (12.16) 
Q2 0.517*** 0.420*** 0.062*** 
 
0.240*** 0.507*** 0.258*** 
 
(21.34) (26.32) (5.62) 
 
(12.39) (30.92) (8.42) 
Q3 0.547*** 0.401*** 0.052*** 
 
0.264*** 0.511*** 0.223*** 
 
(28.01) (26.62) (8.81) 
 
(14.75) (47.73) (12.72) 
Q4 0.539*** 0.410*** 0.051*** 
 
0.253*** 0.516*** 0.225*** 
 
(20.96) (21.49) (6.03) 
 
(11.56) (37.44) (9.97) 
Q5 (High) 0.656*** 0.320*** 0.024*** 
 
0.393*** 0.449*** 0.127*** 
 
(29.95) (16.14) (6.66) 
 
(14.48) (23.29) (8.66) 
High – Low 0.189*** -0.143*** -0.046*** 
 
0.192*** -0.055** -0.157*** 
  (5.87) (-5.34) (-4.74)   (5.47) (-2.28) (-5.71) 
Panel B: Sorted by Institutional Ownership-based Cumulative Comovement (Value-weighted) 
∆IO ∆β 
Proportional Number of Trades 
 
Proportional Trading Volume 
Small Med Large 
 
Small Med Large 
High to Med 
Q1 (Low) 0.363*** 0.516*** 0.118*** 
 
0.112*** 0.422*** 0.461*** 
 
(20.57) (48.01) (14.66) 
 
(9.00) (32.28) (20.99) 
Q2 0.388*** 0.499*** 0.112*** 
 
0.110*** 0.427*** 0.438*** 
 
(24.43) (53.20) (13.91) 
 
(13.09) (42.90) (18.82) 
Q3 0.377*** 0.507*** 0.111*** 
 
0.103*** 0.429*** 0.440*** 
 
(22.93) (49.48) (14.17) 
 
(10.91) (29.29) (21.93) 
Q4 0.397*** 0.491*** 0.108*** 
 
0.117*** 0.426*** 0.411*** 
 
(22.14) (43.95) (12.04) 
 
(11.67) (34.89) (20.11) 
Q5 (High) 0.460*** 0.460*** 0.079*** 
 
0.182*** 0.467*** 0.338*** 
 
(25.43) (33.16) (13.60) 
 
(11.16) (46.31) (18.19) 
High – Low 0.098*** -0.056*** -0.039*** 
 
0.070*** 0.045*** -0.123*** 
  (3.86) (-3.20) (-3.93) 
 
(3.40) (2.74) (-4.27) 
Med to Low 
Q1 (Low) 0.490*** 0.443*** 0.066*** 
 
0.218*** 0.519*** 0.260*** 
 
(20.80) (25.55) (7.05) 
 
(11.18) (32.30) (10.47) 
Q2 0.469*** 0.451*** 0.080*** 
 
0.202*** 0.492*** 0.304*** 
 
(19.80) (27.24) (8.12) 
 
(10.50) (31.90) (9.95) 
Q3 0.516*** 0.425*** 0.058*** 
 
0.233*** 0.506*** 0.262*** 
 
(22.88) (24.40) (7.57) 
 
(11.88) (37.79) (9.91) 
Q4 0.555*** 0.397*** 0.048*** 
 
0.270*** 0.498*** 0.229*** 
 
(25.91) (24.18) (7.71) 
 
(12.83) (40.92) (9.57) 
Q5 (High) 0.602*** 0.367*** 0.031*** 
 
0.327*** 0.486*** 0.147*** 
 
(23.55) (16.10) (7.22) 
 
(11.85) (23.88) (9.99) 
High – Low 0.112*** -0.076*** -0.036*** 
 
0.109*** -0.033 -0.113*** 
  (3.22) (-2.65) (-3.46)   (3.22) (-1.28) (-3.93) 
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Table 9: Determinants of Cumulative Change in Stock Return 
Comovement 
 
Panel A presents the results of the following quarterly Fama-MacBeth regressions 
(Models 1 to 4) and pooled OLS regressions (Models 5 to 8) between cumulative 
change in stock return comovement and firm characteristics, as well as their 
corresponding Newey-West adjusted (Fama-MacBeth) or clustered by firm (pooled 
OLS) t-statistics. All OLS regressions include dummies for quarters. 
                     , 
where       refers to the cumulative change in return comovement of stock   in 
quarter  , and the vector   stacks firm characteristics, including the log(size), 
log(price), turnover ratio, log(Amihud illiquidity) and number of analyst following 
this firm. Cumulative change in return comovement                                
is computed in each quarter as follows. At the beginning of each quarter, stocks are 
sorted into terciles according to lagged institutional ownership. For each fire sale 
stock that switches to a different tercile, return comovement is estimated from the 
following bivariate regression, separately for one quarter before and after the switch.  
                                                                  , 
where        refers to the return of stock   on day   of quarter  ,              and 
              refer to the equal-weighted portfolio return for stocks with different levels 
of institutional ownership (Low, Med and High) before and after the switch, 
respectively. In each quarter,                                is computed to proxy 
for cumulative change in return comovement. Panel B reports similar statistics when 
control for proportional number of small trades (the number of small trades scaled by 
the total number of trades on that stock) and proportional volume of small trades (the 
volume of small trades scaled by the total trading volume on that stock) over the 
period from 1990 to 2000. Numbers with “*”, “**” and “***” are significant at the 










Pooled OLS (Clustered by Firm) 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Constant 4.223*** 2.263*** 3.091*** 3.136*** 
 
4.913*** 2.973*** 4.270*** 4.191*** 
 
(8.68) (5.87) (4.85) (4.87) 
 
(8.67) (5.93) (6.50) (6.32) 















Log (Price)  -0.711*** -0.624*** -0.575***  -0.676*** -0.474*** -0.469*** 
  (-5.22) (-3.53) (-3.43)   (-6.29) (-3.48) (-3.43) 
Turnover  0.504*** 0.488** 0.498*   0.331*** 0.187 0.268 
  (3.62) (2.17) (1.70)   (3.25) (1.44) (1.45) 















Num_AnalystRec 0.101*** 0.048** 0.067*** 0.052* 
 
0.102*** 0.044*** 0.074*** 0.090*** 
 
(4.57) (2.60) (3.31) (1.94) 
 
(4.76) (2.68) (3.42) (3.13) 
Turnover × Num_AnalystRec 
   
0.012 
    
-0.011 
    
(0.32) 
    
(-0.60) 
          Adj-Rsq 0.024 0.039 0.042 0.046 
 
0.026 0.027 0.028 0.029 











Pooled OLS (Clustered by Firm) 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Constant 4.799*** 3.172*** -0.361 0.385 
 
4.407*** 2.085* -1.180 -0.440 
 
(7.86) (4.95) (-0.76) (1.14) 
 
(3.50) (1.81) (-1.01) (-0.38) 
Log (Size) -0.920*** 
    
-0.914*** 
   
 
(-6.25) 
    
(-5.61) 
   Log (Price) 
 
-1.056*** 





    
(-4.69) 
  % Num_Small Trades 
  
3.155*** 
    
2.673*** 
 
   
(3.81) 
    
(3.09) 
 % Volume_Small Trades 
   
3.899*** 
    
2.197* 
    
(2.96) 










    
(3.81) 















Num_AnalystRec 0.115*** 0.041 0.068** 0.066* 
 
0.120*** 0.052* 0.065* 0.062* 
 
(3.4) (1.59) (2.06) (2.01) 
 
(3.43) (1.93) (1.82) (1.76) 
          Adj-Rsq 0.020 0.039 0.004 0.004 
 
0.025 0.029 0.019 0.017 
Obs 3,713 3,713 3,713 3,713 
 




Table 10: International Institutional Ownership-based Stock Return 
Comovement 
 
This table reports the average changes in stock return comovement around 
international institutional ownership change, over the sample period from 2000 to 
2008. An international fund is defined as a fund that not only invests in U.S., and two 
sub-types are indentified according to its domicile country (U.S. or Non-U.S.). At the 
beginning of each quarter, stocks are sorted into terciles according to lagged 
international institutional ownership. For each fire sale stock that switches to a 
different tercile, return comovement is estimated from the following bivariate 
regression, separately for one quarter before and after the switch.  
                                                                  , 
where        refers to the return of stock   on day   of quarter  ,              and 
              refer to the equal-weighted (or value-weighted) portfolio return for stocks 
with different levels of institutional ownership (Low, Med and High) before and after 
the switch, respectively. This table reports average change as well as Newey-West 
adjusted t-statistics in return comovement, when ownership portfolio returns are 
equal-weighted or value-weighted. Numbers with “*”, “**” and “***” are significant 
at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
International Institutional Ownership-based Comovement Change 
∆IO Domicile 
Equal-weighted Value-weighted 
∆βLowIO ∆βMedIO ∆βHighIO ∆βLowIO ∆βMedIO ∆βHighIO 















  (3.05) (-3.10)   (0.68) (-0.93) 













 (0.97) (-1.44)   (-0.23) (-1.07)   






















Table 11: Institutional Ownership-based Stock Return Comovement and 
Market Conditions 
 
Panel A presents the results of the following quarterly time-series regressions, 
                                          , 
where       refers to the average institutional ownership-based stock return 
comovement in quarter          refers to the average monthly Baker and Wurgler 
(2007) market sentiment index,      refers to the average monthly Chicago Board of 
Options Exchange (CBOE) volatility index,         refers to market volatility 
(defined as the standard deviation of daily value-weighted market return in that 
quarter), and the vector   stacks all other control variables, including lag(βIO), 
lag(sentiment), lag(VIX), and lag(market volatility). For each stock with non-zero 
institutional ownership, return comovement is estimated from the following 
regressions in each quarter. 
                                                                   
                   , 
where        refers to the return of stock   on day   of quarter  ,         refers to the 
institutional ownership-weighted return,        ,       ,        and        refer 
to Fama-French-Carhart factors (market, size, book-to-market and momentum). Panel 
A reports the regression parameters as well as their corresponding Newey-West 
adjusted (Models 1 to 5) or clustered by time (Models 6 to 10) t-statistics, over the 
entire sample period from 1990 to 2010. Panel B presents similar statistics of the 
following quarterly time-series regressions, 
                                             , 
where          refers to the average return comovement with low institutional 
ownership portfolio in quarter    estimated from the following regressions. 
                                                                         
                   , 
where            refers to the equal-weighted portfolio return of stocks with low 
(bottom tercile) institutional ownership on day   of quarter  . Panel C reports similar 
regression parameters and Newey-West adjusted t-statistics over the extended period 
from 1980 to 2010. Numbers with “*”, “**” and “***” are significant at the 10%, 5% 






Panel A: Return Comovement (with Institutional Ownership Index) Regressed on Market Conditions (1990 − 2010) 
 
Newey-West adjusted   Clustered by Time 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 
Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Constant 0.318*** 0.370*** 0.474*** 0.291*** 0.360*** 
 
0.318*** 0.370*** 0.474*** 0.291*** 0.360*** 
 
(3.09) (4.53) (4.15) (2.73) (4.34) 
 




































0.003 0.177* 0.120 
   
0.003 0.177 0.120 
   
(0.02) (1.68) (1.08) 
   
(0.02) (1.02) (0.74) 
            AR (1) 0.202 0.165 0.324* 0.168 0.133 
 
0.202* 0.165 0.324** 0.168 0.133 
 
(1.38) (1.18) (1.94) (1.06) (0.89) 
 
(1.75) (1.42) (2.57) (1.39) (1.12) 



































0.011 -0.211** -0.172 
   
0.011 -0.211 -0.172 
   
(0.10) (-2.10) (-1.66) 
   





Panel B: Return Comovement (with Low Institutional Ownership Index) Regressed on Market Conditions (1990 − 2010) 
 
Newey-West adjusted   Clustered by Time 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 
Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Constant 0.166*** 0.156*** 0.221*** 0.210*** 0.202*** 
 
0.166*** 0.156*** 0.221*** 0.210*** 0.202*** 
 
(3.44) (2.91) (3.71) (3.87) (3.48) 
 




































0.049* 0.057** 0.055** 
   
0.049* 0.057** 0.055** 
   
(1.99) (2.25) (2.15) 
   
(1.93) (2.34) (2.22) 
            AR (1) 0.566*** 0.558*** 0.414*** 0.438*** 0.434*** 
 
0.566*** 0.558*** 0.414*** 0.438*** 0.434*** 
 
(4.20) (4.10) (2.87) (3.02) (2.91) 
 
(5.37) (5.26) (3.80) (3.91) (3.77) 



































-0.006 -0.019 -0.018 
   
-0.006 -0.019 -0.018 
   
(-0.27) (-0.85) (-0.77) 
   







Panel C: Return Comovement Regressed on Market Conditions (Newey-West adjusted, 1980 − 2010) 
 
Institutional Ownership Index   Low Institutional Ownership Index 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 
Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Constant 0.318*** 0.298*** 0.392*** 0.291*** 0.315*** 
 
0.166*** 0.171*** 0.193*** 0.210*** 0.178*** 
 
(3.09) (4.26) (4.09) (2.73) (4.12) 
 




































0.022 0.177* 0.107* 
   
0.045 0.057** 0.054* 
   
(0.27) (1.68) (1.71) 
   
(1.55) (2.25) (1.91) 
            AR (1) 0.202 0.278** 0.403*** 0.168 0.239* 
 
0.566*** 0.497*** 0.468*** 0.438*** 0.456*** 
 
(1.38) (2.10) (2.70) (1.06) (1.70) 
 
(4.20) (5.02) (5.64) (3.02) (5.10) 



































-0.049 -0.211** -0.149** 
   
-0.029 -0.019 -0.039 
   
(-0.64) (-2.10) (-2.37) 
   
(-1.01) (-0.85) (-1.38) 
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Table 12: Calendar-time Portfolio Regressions of Stocks with Institutional 
Ownership Change 
 
At the beginning of each quarter, stocks are sorted into terciles according to lagged 
institutional ownership. Next, all stocks that switch to a lower (higher) tercile are 
identified in down (up) portfolios. Finally, rebalance portfolios in each quarter, and 
compute the out of sample performance of these portfolios. Panel A reports the 
CAPM one-factor, Fama-French three-factor, Fama-French-Carhart four-factor 
adjusted return for each portfolio, and the performance difference between up and 
down portfolios (“Up – Down”), over the entire sample period (full sample), as well 
as in the sub-period (up and down). Market is defined to be up (down) market if 
lagged market return is non-negative (negative). Panel B reports Fama-French-
Carhart four-factor adjusted return when skip the most recent quarter, and hold the 
stocks for another six, nine and twelve months, respectively, as well as the 
performance difference between down and up portfolios (“Down – Up”). Newey-
West adjusted t-statistics are shown in parentheses. Numbers with “*”, “**” and “***” 














1-factor 3-factor 4-factor 
 
1-factor 3-factor 4-factor 
 
1-factor 3-factor 4-factor 
High to Med (Down) 
-0.554*** -0.533*** -0.542*** 
 
-0.420 -0.331 -0.355 
 
-0.843*** -0.843*** -0.814*** 
(-2.93) (-2.80) (-2.80) 
 
(-1.59) (-1.23) (-1.31) 
 
(-3.48) (-3.46) (-3.26) 
Med to High (Up) 
0.580*** 0.561*** 0.614*** 
 
0.749*** 0.650*** 0.682*** 
 
0.359 0.381 0.502 
(2.72) (2.91) (3.14) 
 
(2.60) (2.66) (2.77) 
 
(1.16) (1.23) (1.62) 
Up – Down 
1.134*** 1.095*** 1.156*** 
 
1.169*** 0.981** 1.037** 
 
1.202*** 1.224*** 1.317*** 
(3.62) (3.57) (3.72) 
 
(2.74) (2.35) (2.46) 
 
(2.74) (2.78) (2.94) 
Med to Low (Down) 
-0.917*** -0.913*** -0.601** 
 
-0.583 -0.607* -0.266 
 
-1.542*** -1.462*** -1.324*** 
(-3.03) (-3.14) (-2.22) 
 
(-1.56) (-1.66) (-0.87) 
 
(-3.00) (-2.96) (-2.65) 
Low to Med (Up) 
0.379 0.330 0.373 
 
0.614 0.504 0.543 
 
0.018 0.098 0.129 
(1.27) (1.15) (1.28) 
 
(1.55) (1.28) (1.37) 
 
(0.04) (0.23) (0.29) 
Up – Down 
1.296*** 1.244*** 0.975*** 
 
1.197** 1.111** 0.809* 
 
1.559*** 1.560*** 1.453** 
(3.53) (3.35) (2.69)   (2.52) (2.26) (1.75)   (2.69) (2.67) (2.44) 
Panel B: Long-term Risk-adjusted Return 
∆IO 
T+4 to T+9 
 
T+4 to T+12 
 
T+4 to T+15 
Full Sample Up Market Down Market 
 
Full Sample Up Market Down Market 
 
Full Sample Up Market Down Market 
High to Med (Down) 
0.414*** 0.468*** 0.602*** 
 
0.334*** 0.290* 0.498*** 
 
0.359*** 0.294** 0.530*** 
(3.12) (2.97) (2.79) 
 
(2.82) (1.89) (2.99) 
 
(3.14) (2.08) (3.54) 
Med to High (Up) 
0.291*** 0.183 0.495*** 
 
0.223** 0.201* 0.425*** 
 
0.156* 0.106 0.260** 
(2.83) (1.48) (2.92) 
 
(2.30) (1.81) (2.83) 
 
(1.69) (0.96) (2.02) 
Down – Up 
0.123 0.285 0.107 
 
0.111 0.089 0.073 
 
0.202 0.188 0.269 
(0.84) (1.53) (0.46) 
 
(0.83) (0.49) (0.39) 
 
(1.55) (1.07) (1.59) 
Med to Low (Down) 
0.763*** 0.592* 1.213*** 
 
0.685*** 0.412 1.122*** 
 
0.670*** 0.455 0.882*** 
(2.82) (1.83) (2.96) 
 
(2.60) (1.43) (3.18) 
 
(2.71) (1.64) (2.73) 
Low to Med (Up) 
0.334* 0.279 0.380 
 
0.335** 0.315* 0.358 
 
0.393*** 0.495*** 0.218 
(1.95) (1.37) (1.42) 
 
(2.18) (1.77) (1.55) 
 
(2.67) (2.83) (1.08) 
Down – Up 
0.429** 0.313 0.834** 
 
0.350* 0.097 0.764** 
 
0.277* 0.039 0.664** 
(2.01) (1.18) (2.45)   (1.83) (0.41) (2.44)   (1.65) (0.17) (2.41) 
 
